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Abstract 
 
Many financial markets are characterized by strong relationships and networks, rather than arm’s-length, 
spot-market transactions. We examine the performance consequences of this organizational choice in the 
context of relationships established when VCs syndicate portfolio company investments, using a 
comprehensive sample of U.S. based VCs over the period 1980 to 2003. VC funds whose parent firms 
enjoy more influential network positions have significantly better performance, as measured by the 
proportion of portfolio company investments that are successfully exited through an initial public offering 
or a sale to another company. Similarly, the portfolio companies of better networked VC firms are 
significantly more likely to survive to subsequent rounds of financing and to eventual exit. The magnitude 
of these effects is economically large, and is robust to a wide range of specifications. Once we control for 
network effects in our models of fund and portfolio company performance, the importance of how much 
investment experience a VC has is reduced, and in some specifications, eliminated. Finally, we provide 
initial evidence on the evolution of VC networks.  
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Networks are widespread in many financial markets. Bulge-bracket investment banks, for instance, have 
strong relationships with institutional investors which they make use of when pricing and distributing 
corporate securities (Benveniste and Spindt (1989), Cornelli and Goldreich (2001)). In the corporate loan 
market, banks often prefer syndicating loans with other banks over being the sole lender. Similarly, in the 
primary equity and bond markets, banks tend to co-underwrite securities offerings with banks they have 
long-standing relationships with (Corwin and Schultz (2005)). 
In the same spirit, networks feature prominently in the venture capital industry. VCs tend to syndicate 
their investments with other VCs, rather than investing alone (Lerner (1994a)). They are thus bound by 
their current and past investments into webs of relationships with other VCs. Once they have invested in a 
company, VCs draw on their networks of service providers – head hunters, patent lawyers, investment 
bankers etc. – to help the company succeed (Gorman and Sahlman (1989), Sahlman (1990)). Indeed, one 
prominent VC goes as far as describing itself as a venture keiretsu (Lindsey (2003), Hsu (2004)). The 
capital VCs invest in promising new ventures comes from a small set of institutional and other investors 
with whom they tend to have long-established relationships. In all these instances, many VCs show a 
preference for networks rather than arm’s-length, spot-market transactions. 
While the prevalence of networking in many financial markets has been documented in the literature, 
the performance consequences of this organizational choice remain unknown. In the venture capital market, 
for instance, some VCs presumably have better-quality relationships and hence enjoy more influential 
network positions than others, implying differences in their clout, investment opportunity sets, access to 
information, etc. In this study, we ask whether these differences help explain the cross-section of VC 
investment performance.  
We focus on the co-investment networks that VC syndication gives rise to, and leave the other two 
main networks VCs use (involving service providers and institutional investors in their funds) to future 
research. Syndication relationships are a natural starting point, not only because they are easy to observe, 
but also because there are good reasons to believe they are vital to a VC’s performance. The two main 
drivers of a VC’s performance are the ability to source high-quality deal flow (i.e., the ability to select 
promising companies), and the ability to nurture its investments (i.e., the ability to add value to portfolio 
companies). Syndication likely affects both of these performance drivers.  
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There are at least three reasons to expect syndication networks to improve the quality of deal flow. 
First, VCs invite others to co-invest in their promising deals in expectation of future reciprocity (Lerner 
(1994a)). Second, by checking each other’s willingness to invest in potentially promising deals, VCs can 
pool correlated signals and thereby may select better investments in situations of often extreme uncertainty 
about the viability and return potential of investment proposals (Wilson (1968), Sah and Stiglitz (1986)). 
Third, individual VCs tend to have investment expertise that is both sector-specific and location-specific. 
Syndication helps diffuse information across sector boundaries and expands the spatial radius of exchange, 
thus allowing VCs to diversify their portfolios (Stuart and Sorensen (2001)).  
In addition to improving deal flow, syndication networks may also help VCs add value to their portfolio 
companies.1 Syndication networks facilitate the sharing of information, contacts, and resources among VCs 
(Bygrave (1988)), for instance by expanding the range of strategic alliance partners and launch customers 
for their portfolio companies. No less importantly, strong relationships with other VCs likely improve the 
chances of securing follow-on VC funding for portfolio companies, and may indirectly provide access to 
other VCs’ relationships with service providers such as head hunters and prestigious investment banks.  
An examination of the performance consequences of VC networks requires measures of how well 
networked a VC is. We borrow these measures from graph theory, a mathematical discipline widely used in 
economic sociology.2 Graph theory provides us with tools for describing networks at a “macro” level and 
for measuring the relative importance, or “centrality,” of each actor in the network. Our centrality measures 
capture five different aspects of a VC firm’s influence: The number of VCs it has relationships with, as a 
proxy for the information, deal flow, expertise, contacts, and pools of capital it has access to; the frequency 
with which it is invited to co-invest in other VCs’ deals, thereby expanding its investment opportunity set; 
its ability to generate such co-investment opportunities in the future by syndicating its own deals today in 
the hope of future payback from its syndication partners; its access to the best-connected VCs; and its 
                                                 
1 The literature has documented a number of ways in which VCs add value to their portfolio companies, such as addressing 
weaknesses in the original business plan or the entrepreneurial team (Kaplan and Strömberg (2004)), professionalizing the 
company (Hellmann and Puri (2002)), reducing the time to product market (Hellmann and Puri (2000)), facilitating 
strategic alliances among portfolio companies (Lindsey (2003)), and ensuring strong governance structures at the time of 
the IPO (Hochberg (2004)). 
2 Examples of prior applications of network analysis in a financial context include Robinson and Stuart (2004), who study 
the governance of strategic alliances, and Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels (1999), who focus on the effect of strategic alliance 
networks on the performance of biotech ventures. 
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ability to act as an intermediary who can bring together VCs with complementary skills or investment 
opportunities who lack a direct relationship between them. 
In addition to measures of how well networked each VC is, we require data on the performance of VC 
investments. We examine both the performance of the VC fund and of the fund’s portfolio companies. At 
the fund level, we examine “exit rates” in the absence of publicly available data on VC fund returns. We 
define a fund’s exit rate as the fraction of portfolio companies that are successfully exited via an initial 
public offering (IPO) or a sale to another company. At the portfolio company level, we examine not only 
whether or not the portfolio company achieved a successful exit, but also intermediate performance, 
namely whether the portfolio company survived to obtain an additional round of funding.  
Controlling for other known determinants of VC fund performance such as fund size (Kaplan and 
Schoar (2005)) as well as the competitive funding environment and the investment opportunities facing the 
VC (Gompers and Lerner (2000)), we find that VCs that are better networked at the time a fund is raised 
subsequently enjoy significantly better fund performance, as measured by the rate of successful portfolio 
exits over the next ten years. Comparing our five centrality measures suggests that the size of a VC firm’s 
network, its ability to be invited into other VCs’ syndicates, and its access to the best networked VCs have 
the largest effect economically, while an ability to act as an intermediary in bringing other VCs together 
plays less of a role. The economic magnitude of these effects is meaningful: Depending on the 
specification, a one-standard-deviation increase in network centrality increases exit rates by around two 
percentage points from the 34.2% sample average. Using limited data on fund IRRs disclosed following 
recent Freedom of Information Act lawsuits, we estimate that this is roughly equivalent to a two percentage 
point increase in fund IRR from the 15% sample average.  
When we examine performance at the portfolio company level, we find that a VC’s network centrality 
has a positive and significant effect on the probability that a portfolio company survives to a subsequent 
funding round or exits successfully. This effect is large economically. For instance, the survival probability 
in the first funding round increases from the unconditional expectation of 66.8% to 72.4% for a one-
standard-deviation increase in the lead VC’s network centrality.  
Perhaps the leading alternative explanation for the performance-enhancing role of VC networking is 
simply experience (e.g., Kaplan, Martel, and Strömberg (2003)). It seems plausible that the better-
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networked VCs are also the older and more experienced VCs. To rule out that our measures of network 
centrality merely proxy for experience, our models explicitly control for a variety of dimensions of VC 
experience. Interestingly, once we control for VC networks, the beneficial effect of experience on 
performance is reduced, and in some specifications, eliminated. It is also not the case that the better-
networked VCs are simply the ones with better past performance records: While we do find evidence of 
persistence in performance from one fund to the next, our measures of network centrality continue to have 
a positive and significant effect on fund exit rates when we control for persistence.  
The way we construct the centrality measures makes it unlikely that our results are driven simply by 
reverse causality (that is, the argument that superior performance enables VCs to improve their network 
positions, rather than the other way around). For a fund of a given vintage year, measures of network 
centrality are constructed from syndication data for the five preceding years. Performance is then taken as 
the exit rate over the life of the fund, which lasts 10-12 years. Thus, we are relating a VC firm’s past 
network position to its future performance. Moreover, we find little evidence that past exits drive future 
network position. Instead, what appears to be key in improving a VC firm’s network position is 
demonstrating skill in selecting, and adding value to, investments. 
We also explore an alternative explanation for the positive relation between exit rates and network 
centrality, namely that better networked VCs may simply be better at hoodwinking the public markets into 
buying their more marginal companies, but find little support for this explanation.  
Our main results are based on centrality measures derived from syndication networks that span all 
industries and the entire United States. To the extent that VC networks are geographically concentrated or 
industry-specific, this may underestimate a VC’s network centrality. We therefore repeat our analysis using 
industry-specific networks and a separate network of VC firms in California, the largest VC market in the 
U.S.  Our results are not only robust to these modifications, but their economic significance increases 
substantially. In the California network, exit rates improve by approximately five percentage points relative 
to the unconditional mean of 35.7% among California VCs.  
Our contribution is fivefold. This is the first paper to examine the performance consequences of the VC 
industry’s predominant choice of organizational form: Networks. Previous work has focused on describing 
the structure of syndication networks (Bygrave (1987, 1988), Stuart and Sorensen (2001)) and motivating 
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the use of syndication (Lerner (1994a), Podolny (2001), Brander, Amit, and Antweiler (2002)). Second, our 
findings shed light on the industrial organization of the VC market. Like many financial markets, the VC 
market differs from the traditional arm’s-length spot markets of classical microeconomics. The high returns 
to being well-networked we document suggest that enhancing one’s network position should be an 
important strategic consideration for an incumbent VC, while presenting a potential barrier to entry for new 
VCs. Third, our findings have ramifications for institutional investors choosing VC funds to invest in, as 
better networked VCs appear to perform better. Fourth, our analysis provides a deeper understanding of the 
possible drivers of cross-sectional performance of VC funds, and points to the importance of additional 
fundamentals beyond those previously documented in the academic literature. Finally, we provide 
preliminary evidence regarding the evolution of a VC firm’s network position. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I provides an overview of network analysis 
techniques and discusses their implementation in the VC context. A simple example illustrating network 
analysis is presented in the Appendix. Section II describes our data. In Section III, we analyze the effect of 
VC networking on fund performance. Section IV examines the relation between networking and portfolio 
company survival. Section V presents additional robustness checks, including an examination of the effects 
of industry-specific and spatially separated networks. Section VI investigates how a VC becomes 
influential in the VC network. Section VII concludes.  
I. Network Analysis Methodology 
The aim of network analysis is to describe the structure of networks, by focusing first and foremost on 
the relationships that exist among a set of economic actors and less on the individual actors’ characteristics 
(such as age, wealth, etc.). For instance, a network might be described as “dense” (if many actors are tied to 
one another via reciprocated relationships) or “sparse” (if actors tend to be more autarkic). It might have 
one dense area surrounded by a periphery of sparsely connected actors, or it might have several clusters of 
dense areas that occasionally interact with each other. The network might be populated by uniformly 
influential actors, or there may be variation in actors’ influence. And so on. 
Influence is usually measured by how “central” an actor’s network position is. An actor is considered 
central if he is extensively involved in relationships with other actors. Consider the most centralized of 
networks, the “star,” in which one actor is connected to all other actors, none of whom is connected to 
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anyone else. Clearly, the actor at the center of the star is the most influential. Contrast this with a ring-
shaped network, in which all actors are equally central. In the VC market, greater centrality may translate 
into better access to information, deal flow, deeper pools of capital, expertise, contacts, and so on. 
Network analysis uses a branch of mathematics called graph theory to make the concept of centrality 
more precise.3 Consider the network illustrated in Figure 1, which graphs the syndication relationships 
among U.S. biotech-focused VCs over the period 1990 through 1994.4 VC firms are represented as nodes 
and arrows represent the ties among them. Arrows point from the originator of the tie (the VC leading the 
syndicate in question) to the receiver (the VC invited to co-invest in the portfolio company). Visually, it 
appears that two firms – 826 and 2584 – are the most “central” in this network, in the sense that they are 
connected to the most VC firms, and that firm 826 is invited to join other VCs’ syndicates most often.  
In graph theory, a network such as the one illustrated in Figure 1 is represented by a square “adjacency” 
matrix, the cells of which reflect the ties among the actors in the network. In our setting, we code two VCs 
co-investing in the same portfolio company as having a tie.5 Adjacency matrices can be “directed” or 
“undirected.” Only directed matrices differentiate between the originator and the receiver of a tie. (Figure 1 
illustrates a directed network.) In our setting, the undirected adjacency matrix records as a tie any 
participation by both VC firm i and VC firm j in a syndicate. The directed adjacency matrix differentiates 
between syndicates led by VC i versus those led by VC j.6  
Networks are not static. Relationships may change, and entry to and exit from the network may change 
each actor’s centrality. We therefore construct our adjacency matrices over trailing five-year windows. 
Using these matrices, we construct five centrality measures based on three popular concepts of centrality: 
Degree, closeness, and betweenness. Using a numerical example, the Appendix shows in detail how these 
centrality measures are constructed. Here, we focus on how each measure captures a slightly different 
aspect of a VC’s economic role in the network.  
                                                 
3 See Wasserman and Faust (1997) for a detailed review of network analysis methods.  
4 For tractability, the graph excludes biotech-focused VC firms that have no syndication relationships during this period. 
5 As the example in the Appendix illustrates, this method of coding ties produces a binary adjacency matrix. It is possible to 
construct a valued adjacency matrix accounting not only for the existence of a tie between two VCs but also for the number 
of times there is a tie between them. While the results reported in the following sections utilize the binary matrix, we note 
that all our results are robust to using network centrality measures calculated from valued matrices. 
6 Unlike the undirected matrix, the directed matrix does not record a tie between VCs j and k who were members of the 
same syndicate if neither led the syndicate in question. 
  
7
A. Degree Centrality 
Degree centrality measures the number of relationships an actor in the network has. The more ties, the 
more opportunities for exchange and so the more influential, or central, the actor. VCs who have ties to 
many other VCs may be in an advantaged position. Since they have many ties, they are less dependent on 
any one VC for information or deal flow. In addition, they may have access to a wider range of expertise, 
contacts, and pools of capital. Formally, degree counts the number of unique ties each VC has, i.e., the 
number of unique VCs a VC has co-invested with. Let pij be an indicator equaling one if at least one 
syndication relationship exists between VCs i and j, and zero otherwise. VC i’s degree then equals Σi pij.  
In undirected data, where we do not distinguish between the originator and receiver of a tie, VCs’ 
degrees differ merely as a result of the number of ties they have. In directed data, we can distinguish 
between VCs who receive many ties (i.e., are invited to be syndicate members by many lead VCs) and 
those who originate many ties (i.e., lead syndicates with many other VC members). This gives rise to two 
directed measures of degree centrality. 
Indegree is a measure of the frequency with which a VC firm is invited to co-invest in other VCs’ 
deals, thereby expanding its investment opportunity set and gaining access to information and resources it 
otherwise may not have had access to. Formally, let qji be an indicator equaling one if at least one 
syndication relationship exists in which VC j was the lead investor and VC i was a syndicate member, and 
zero otherwise. VC i’s indegree then equals Σi qji.  
Outdegree is a measure of a VC’s ability to generate future co-investment opportunities by inviting 
others into its syndicates today (i.e., reciprocity). Outdegree counts the number of other VCs a VC firm 
invites into its own syndicates. Formally, as before, let qij be an indicator equaling one if at least one 
syndication relationship exists in which VC i was the lead investor and VC j was a syndicate member, and 
zero otherwise. VC i’s outdegree then equals Σj qij. 
Clearly, all three degree centrality measures are a function of network size, which in our dataset varies 
over time due to entry and exit by VCs. To ensure comparability over time, we normalize each degree 
centrality measure by dividing by the maximum possible degree in an n-actor network (i.e., n–1).7 
                                                 
7 While we normalize the centrality measures used in the empirical analysis, we note that all our results are robust to using 
non-normalized network centrality measures instead. 
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B. Closeness 
While degree counts the number of relationships an actor has, closeness takes into account their 
“quality.” A particularly useful measure of closeness is “eigenvector centrality” (Bonacich (1972, 1987)), 
which weights an actor’s ties to others by the importance of the actors he is tied to. In essence, eigenvector 
centrality is a recursive measure of degree, whereby the centrality of an actor is defined as the sum of his 
ties to other actors, weighted by their respective centralities.  
Formally, let pij be an indicator equaling one if at least one syndication relationship exists between VC i 
and VC j, and zero otherwise. VC i’s eigenvector centrality is then defined as evi = Σj pij evj (which is 
equivalent to the components of the principal eigenvector of the adjacency matrix).8 In our setting, 
eigenvector centrality measures the extent to which a VC is connected to other well-connected VCs. This is 
normalized by the highest eigenvector centrality measure possible in a network of n actors.  
C. Betweenness Centrality 
Betweenness attributes influence to actors on whom many others must rely to make connections within 
the network. For example, in a star, the actor at the center stands between every pair of actors, who must 
involve him to reach one another. In our setting, betweenness proxies for the extent to which a VC may act 
as an intermediary by bringing together VCs with complementary skills or investment opportunities who 
lack a direct relationship between them. Formally, let bjk be the proportion of all paths linking actors j and k 
which pass through actor i. The betweenness of actor i is defined as the sum of all bjk where i, j, and k are 
distinct. It is normalized by dividing by the maximum betweenness in an n-actor network.  
II. Sample and Data 
Data for our analysis are obtained from Thomson Financial’s Venture Economics database. Venture 
Economics began compiling data on venture capital investments in 1977, and has since backfilled the data 
to the early 1960s. Gompers and Lerner (1999) investigate the completeness of the Venture Economics 
database and conclude that it covers more than 90% of all venture investments.  
Most VC funds are structured as closed-end, often ten-year, limited partnerships. They are not stock 
                                                 
8 Formally, given an adjacency matrix A, the eigenvector centrality of actor i is given by evi=a∑Aijevj where a is a 
parameter required to give the equations a non-trivial solution (and is therefore the reciprocal of an eigenvalue). As the 
centrality of each actor is determined by the centrality of the actors he is connected to, the centralities will be the elements 
of the principal eigenvector.  
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market traded, nor do they disclose fund valuations. The typical fund spends its first three or so years 
selecting companies to invest in, and then nurtures them over the next few years (Ljungqvist and 
Richardson (2003)). Successful portfolio companies are exited via IPOs or sales to other companies, which 
generate capital inflows (and hopefully capital gains) that are distributed to the fund’s investors. The exit 
phase typically occupies the second half of the fund’s life. At the end of the fund’s life, any remaining 
portfolio holdings are sold or liquidated and the proceeds distributed to the investors. 
Owing to this investment cycle, relatively recent funds have not yet operated for long enough to 
measure their lifetime performance. But simply excluding relatively recent funds is sometimes felt to result 
in performance measures that do not reflect the changes in, and current state of, the VC industry. As a 
compromise, Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2003) consider all funds raised up to 
and including 1999, but also show robustness to excluding funds that have not yet completed their ten-year 
runs as of the end of their sample period. In the same spirit, we consider all investments made by VC funds 
raised between 1980 and 1999 that are included in the Venture Economics database. We begin in 1980 
because venture capital as an asset class that attracts institutional investors has only existed since the 1980 
ERISA “Safe Harbor” regulation.9 Closing the sample period at year-end 1999 provides at least four years 
of operation for the youngest funds, using November 2003 as the latest date for measuring fund 
performance. Our results are robust to excluding funds that have not yet completed their ten-year lives. 
We concentrate solely on investments by U.S. based VC funds, and exclude investments by angels and 
buyout funds.10 We distinguish between funds and firms. While VC funds have a limited (usually ten-year) 
life, the VC management firms that manage the funds have no predetermined lifespan. A first-time fund 
that is successful often enables the VC firm to raise a follow-on fund (Kaplan and Schoar (2005)), resulting 
in a sequence of funds raised a few years apart. We will measure VC experience and networks at the parent 
firm-level rather than the fund-level.11 This assumes that experience and contacts acquired in the running of 
                                                 
9 The institutionalization of the VC industry is commonly dated to three events: The 1978 Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) whose “Prudent Man” rule allowed pension funds to invest in higher-risk asset classes; the 1980 
Small Business Investment Act which redefined VC fund managers as business development companies rather than 
investment advisers, so lowering their regulatory burdens; and the 1980 ERISA “Safe Harbor” regulation which sanctioned 
limited partnerships which are now the dominant organizational form in the industry. 
10 We do, however, include corporate venture programs as long as Venture Economics reports data for their size. 
11 Occasionally, Venture Economics assigns more than one name to the same VC firm (e.g. “Alex Brown and Sons,” “Alex 
Brown & Sons”). We manually consolidate VC firm names where applicable. 
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one fund carry over to the firm’s next fund. 
In the estimation datasets, there are 3,469 VC funds managed by 1,974 VC firms which participate in 
47,705 investment rounds involving 16,315 portfolio companies. 44.7% of investment rounds and 50.3% of 
sample companies involve syndicated funding.  
We define what constitutes a syndicate two different ways. For the two directed centrality measures, 
indegree and outdegree, we need to distinguish between VCs who lead syndicates and those who are co-
investors. To do so, we examine syndicates at the investment-round level. We define the syndicate as the 
collection of VC firms that invest in a given portfolio company investment round. As per convention, we 
identify the lead investor as the syndicate member making the largest investment in the round.12  
For the remaining undirected centrality measures, we are primarily interested in the ties among VCs 
instanced by co-investment in the same portfolio company. Here, we are less concerned with whether the 
co-investment occurred in the same financing round or in different rounds, because we assume VC 
relationships are built by interacting with one another in board meetings and other activities that help the 
portfolio company succeed. Thus, a VC who invested in the company’s first round may interact with a VC 
who joined in the second round. To capture this, we examine syndicates at the company level and define the 
syndicate as the collection of VC firms that invested in a given portfolio company.  
All our results are robust, both in terms of economic and statistical significance, to employing either 
definition of syndicate for both the directed and undirected centrality measures.  
A. Fund Characteristics 
Table I describes our sample funds. The average VC fund in our sample had $64 million of capital 
available for investment, with a range from $0.1 million to $5 billion. (Fund size information is unavailable 
for 364 of the 3,469 sample funds.) Once successful, VC management firms tend to raise new funds. The 
fund sequence number denotes whether a fund is the first, second and so forth fund raised by a particular 
VC management firm. The average sample fund is a third fund, though sequence numbers are missing in 
Venture Economics for a third of the funds. A quarter of funds are identified as first-time funds. Around a 
third (36.5%) focus on seed or early-stage investment opportunities.  
                                                 
12 Ties are broken by defining the lead investor as the VC with the largest cumulative investment in the company to date. 
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Many VCs specialize in a particular industry, and important performance drivers such as investment 
opportunities and competition for deal flow likely vary across industries. Venture Economics does not 
identify which industry a fund specializes in, but it classifies the funds’ portfolio companies into six broad 
groups. We take a sample fund’s industry specialization to be the broad Venture Economics industry group 
that accounts for most of its invested capital. On this basis, 46.2% of funds specialize in “Computer 
related” companies, 18.9% in “Non-high-technology,” 9.2% in “Medical, health, life sciences,” 15.5% in 
“Communications and media,” 6% in “Biotechnology,” and 4.3% in “Semiconductors, other electronics.”  
B. Measuring Fund Performance 
Ideally, we would measure fund performance directly, using for instance the internal rate of return a 
fund achieved over its ten-year life. However, fund returns in the form required for this study are not 
systematically available to researchers as VC funds generally do not disclose their performance to anyone 
other than their own investors. Venture Economics collects fund performance data from VC investors, but 
only makes them publicly available in aggregate form (e.g., “the median IRR for funds raised in 1993 
was...”). Some researchers have recently had access to disaggregated performance data from Venture 
Economics, but only in anonymized format (see Kaplan and Schoar (2005); Jones and Rhodes-Kropf 
(2003)). Absent a facility for identifying individual funds and thus matching their performance data to their 
network characteristics and other cross-sectional variables, these anonymized data would not help us 
examine the effect of VC networking on investment performance. 
Instead, we measure fund performance indirectly. Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) report that 75.3% 
of investments are written off completely in the average VC fund in their sample. This implies that VC 
funds earn their capital gains from a small subset of their portfolio companies, namely those that they exit 
via an IPO or a sale to another company (M&A).13 All else equal, the more successful exits a fund has, the 
larger will be its IRR. Thus, we take as our main proxy for VC fund performance the fraction of the fund’s 
portfolio companies that have been successfully exited via an IPO or M&A transaction, as identified in the 
Venture Economics database as of November 2003. In Section III.E, we show that this is a reasonable 
proxy for fund returns. 
                                                 
13 Unsuccessful investments are typically shut down or sold to management for a nominal sum.  
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Table I provides descriptive statistics on our performance measure. In the sample of 3,469 funds raised 
between 1980 and 1999, the exit rate averages 34.2%. IPOs outnumber M&A transactions three-to-two 
(with exit rates of 20.7% and 13.6%, respectively). These exit rates are comparable to those reported in 
Gompers and Lerner (2000) for the 1987-1991 period. Our results are robust to computing exit rates using 
instead the fraction of dollars invested in companies that are successfully exited. Dollar exit rates are a little 
higher, averaging 35.8%.  
Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of exit rates over time, plotting the average exit rate of all sample 
funds by vintage year. Exit rates peaked among funds raised in 1988, and there is mild evidence of an 
upward trend in exit rates among funds raised before 1988 and a more pronounced downward trend among 
funds raised since. The youngest funds – those raised in 1998 and 1999 – have markedly lower exit rates. 
This could be because they have yet to complete their ten-year investment lives. Alternatively, the 
deterioration in the investment climate and, especially, in the IPO market since the ending of the dot-com 
and technology booms of the late 1990s may result in these funds never matching the performance of 
earlier VC vintages. Whatever the reason, to capture the pronounced time pattern evident in Figure 2, we 
include year dummies throughout our fund-level analysis.  
C. Company-level Performance Measures  
Data limitations prevent us from computing company-level rates of return: The Venture Economics 
database does not include details on the fraction of equity acquired by the VCs or the securities they hold, 
and occasionally lacks information even on the amount invested.14 Instead, we use two indirect measures of 
company-level performance. Most venture-backed investments are “staged” in the sense that portfolio 
companies are periodically reevaluated and receive follow-on funding only if their prospects remain 
promising (Gompers (1995)). Thus, we view survival to another funding round as an interim signal of 
success. Eventually, successful portfolio companies are taken public or sold. Absent return data, we follow 
Gompers and Lerner (1998, 2000), Brander, Amit, and Antweiler (2002) and Sorensen (2003) in taking the 
                                                 
14 But see Cochrane (2005) for an analysis of company-level rates of return using data from an alternative database 
(VentureOne), and see Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) for similar analysis using a proprietary dataset of 4,000 private 
equity-backed companies. 
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occurrence of an IPO or M&A transaction as a final signal of the investment’s success.15 
We restrict the dataset to companies that received their first institutional funding round between 1980 
and 1999, and record their subsequent funding rounds and, if applicable, exit events through November 
2003.16 Figure 3 shows what happened to these 16,315 companies. Around a third of the companies do not 
survive beyond the first funding round and are thus written off. 1,020 companies (6.3%) proceed to an IPO 
or M&A transaction after the first round. The remaining 9,875 companies (60.5%) receive follow-on 
funding. Conditional on surviving to round 2, the survival probability increases: Of the 9,875 companies 
having survived round 1, 7.7% exit and 70% survive to round 3. Conditional on surviving to round 3, 
10.1% exit and 69.2% survive to round 4. And so forth. Overall, 4,235 of the 16,315 portfolio companies 
(26%) have successfully exited by November 2003. The median company receives two funding rounds. 
It is important to realize that Venture Economics provides next to no information about the portfolio 
companies, beyond the dates of the funding rounds, the identity of the investors, subsequent exits, and the 
companies’ Venture Economics industry classification. Of the 16,315 companies with first rounds in the 
dataset, 32.7% are classified by Venture Economics as “Computer related,” 30.9% as “Non-high-
technology,” 14.1% as “Communications and media,” 10.9% as “Medical, health, life sciences,” 6.4% as 
“Semiconductors, other electronics,” and 4.9% as “Biotechnology.”  
D. VC Firm Experience 
Kaplan and Schoar (2005) provide convincing evidence of persistence in returns across a sequence of 
funds managed by the same VC firm. Such persistence highlights the importance of investment skill and 
experience. While skill is difficult to measure, we derive four proxies of investment experience for each 
VC firm and for each year the VC firm is active in the sample. These control variables measure the age of 
the VC firm (the number of days since the VC firm’s first-ever investment), the number of rounds the firm 
has participated in, the cumulative total amount it has invested, and the number of portfolio companies it 
                                                 
15 Unlike Gompers and Lerner (1998) and Brander, Amit, and Antweiler (2002), we account for successful exits via M&A 
transactions as well as IPOs. 
16 We thus exclude companies (and all their funding rounds) that received their first institutional funding round before 
1980, even if they subsequently received follow-on funding after 1980. Our dataset does, however, include companies that 
received a non-institutional funding round prior to 1980 (typically involving angel investors or friends and family). 
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has backed. Each is calculated using data from the VC firm’s creation to year t.17 To illustrate, by the time 
Sequoia Capital raised Fund IX in 1999, it had been active for 24 years, and had participated in 888 rounds 
investing a total of $1,275 million in 379 separate portfolio companies. 
E. Network Measures  
Over our sample period, the VC industry saw substantial entry and exit and thus a considerable 
reordering of relationships. To capture the dynamics of these processes, we construct a new network for 
each year t, using data on syndications from the five years ending in t.18 Within each of these five-year 
windows, we make no distinction between relationships reflected in earlier or later syndicates. We then use 
the resulting adjacency matrices to construct the five centrality measures described in Section I. 
The parent of the average sample fund has normalized outdegree of 1.203%, indegree of 1.003%, and 
degree of 4.237% (see Table I). This means that the average VC, when acting as lead, involves a little over 
1% of all VCs active in the market at the time as co-investors; is invited to become a syndicate member by 
around 1% of all VCs; and has co-investment relationships with a little over 4% of the other VCs (ignoring 
its and their roles in the syndicate). Coupled with the fact that more than half of all investments are 
syndicated, these low degree centrality scores suggest that VCs each repeatedly co-invest with a small set 
of other VCs, that is, that relationships are relatively exclusive and stable. 
To illustrate the variation in the degree measures, we consider the extremes. Over the five years ending 
in 1999, New Enterprise Associates syndicated with the largest number of VCs (369). By contrast, 186 
(10.3%) of the 1,812 VC firms active in the market during the 1995-1999 window never syndicated any 
investments, preferring instead to invest on their own. 
Betweenness and eigenvector centrality average 0.29% and 3.74% of their respective theoretical 
maximum. Throughout most of the 1990s, New Enterprise Associates had the highest betweenness 
centrality scores (standing “between” approximately 6% of all possible VC pairs), only to be overtaken by 
Intel Capital, the venture capital arm of Intel Corp, in 1999. 
                                                 
17 Since Venture Economics’ data are somewhat unreliable before 1980, we ignore investments dated earlier than 1975. 
This coding convention does not affect our results. 
18 All our results are robust to using three-, seven-, or ten-year windows instead, with shorter windows generally being 
associated with stronger effects. 
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F. The Macro Structure of VC Networks 
Table II provides a macro-level description of each of our five-year networks, from 1976-1980 to 1999-
2003. We list the number of VC firms that lead-manage an investment round in each five-year window, the 
total number of VCs that participate in investment rounds, and the number of investment rounds concluded 
during the window. For instance, during the five years to 1980, 374 VC firms participated in 1,541 
investment rounds, 243 of whom acted one or more times as lead investor. 
Overall, VC syndication networks are not particularly dense. As a proportion of all the relationships 
between every pair of VCs that could be present, the density of undirected ties peaked at 4.5% in 1987-
1991 and has been declining to below 2% since. Directed ties (i.e., those between lead VC and syndicate 
members) are even less dense. In part, this simply reflects the large number of VCs and the tendency of 
some VCs never to syndicate their investments,19 but it likely also reflects the aforementioned exclusivity 
and repeated nature of syndication relationships evident in the low individual degree centrality scores. 
Low density can suggest high centralization. A simple way to measure the overall centralization of a 
network (as opposed to the centrality of individual actors) is to express the network-wide variation in the 
actors’ degree, betweenness, and eigenvector centralities as a percentage of the variation we would observe 
in the most centralized network, a perfect star, of equivalent size. The resulting centralization numbers can 
be interpreted as measures of the degree of inequality in the network. As Table II shows, outdegree, degree, 
and eigenvector centrality are each relatively unequally distributed, suggesting that the influence of 
individual VCs varies substantially. In other words, positional advantage is quite unequally distributed in 
our networks. 
G. Competition for Deal Flow and Investment Opportunities 
Our models include a range of control variables. Gompers and Lerner (2000) show that the prices VCs 
pay when investing in portfolio companies increase as more money flows into the VC industry, holding 
investment opportunities constant. They interpret this pattern as evidence that competition for scarce 
investment opportunities drives up valuations. If so, it seems plausible that competition for deal flow also 
affects the quality of VCs’ investments and thus their performance. We therefore include in our fund-level 
                                                 
19 All our results are robust to excluding VC firms that never syndicate. 
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and company-level models the aggregate VC fund inflows in the year a sample fund was raised and the 
year a portfolio company completed a funding round, respectively. Table I shows that the average sample 
fund was raised in a year in which $23.8 billion flowed into the VC industry. This ranges from a low of 
$2.3 billion (1980) to a high of $84.6 billion (1999). 
Controlling for the investment opportunities open to a VC is harder. Gompers and Lerner (2000) 
propose public-market pricing multiples as indirect measures of the investment climate in the private 
markets. There is a long tradition in corporate finance, based on Tobin (1969), that views low book-to-
market (B/M) ratios in an industry as an indication of favorable investment opportunities. Price-earnings 
(P/E) ratios are sometimes used for the same purpose. By definition, private companies lack market value 
data, so we must rely on multiples from publicly traded companies. To allow for inter-industry differences 
in investment opportunities, we map all COMPUSTAT companies into the six broad Venture Economics 
industries. We begin with VC-backed companies that Venture Economics identifies as having gone public, 
and for which therefore SIC codes are available. We then identify which Venture Economics industry each 
available four-digit SIC code is linked to most often.20 We compute the pricing multiple for each of the six 
Venture Economics industries in year t as the value-weighted average multiple of all COMPUSTAT 
companies in the relevant four-digit SIC industries.21  
VC funds take a number of years to invest their available capital. Thus, we have to decide over what 
time period to measure their investment opportunities. For the purpose of the fund-level analyses in Section 
III, we average B/M and P/E ratios over each fund’s first three years of existence, to approximate its active 
investment period. Results are robust to using longer or shorter windows. Table I reveals the average fund 
to face a P/E ratio of 16.4 and a B/M ratio of 0.514 in its industry of specialization over the first three years 
of its life. 
                                                 
20 Similar results are obtained when using three-digit SIC codes. 
21 We define a public company’s P/E ratio as the ratio of stock price (COMPUSTAT data item #199) to earnings-per-share 
excluding extraordinary items (#58). We define the B/M ratio as the ratio of book equity to market equity, where book 
equity is defined as total assets (#6) minus liabilities (#181) minus preferred stock (#10, #56, or #130, in order of 
availability) plus deferred tax and investment tax credit (#35), and market equity is defined as stock price (#199) multiplied 
by shares outstanding (#25). To control for outliers, we follow standard convention and winsorize the P/E and B/M ratios at 
the 5th and 95th percentiles for the universe of firms in COMPUSTAT in that year. (The results are robust to other 
winsorization cutoffs.) To calculate a value-weighted average, we consider as weights both the firm’s market value (market 
value of equity plus liabilities minus deferred tax and investment tax credit plus preferred stock) and the dollar amount of 
investment in each four-digit SIC code each year (as calculated from the Venture Economics database). 
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III. Fund-level Analysis 
A. Benchmark Determinants of Fund Performance 
We begin by replicating Kaplan and Schoar’s (2005) fund performance model, to validate our use of 
exit rates instead of fund returns as the measure of performance. Kaplan and Schoar relate VC fund 
performance to two fund characteristics (as well as a set of vintage year dummies): Log fund size and log 
fund sequence number, each of which is included in levels and squares. Our results are reported in Table 
III. When we include both fund size and fund sequence number in the model, only the year dummies are 
significant (see column (1)).22 Consistent with Kaplan and Schoar, we find only weak evidence that higher 
sequence number funds perform better (p=0.099) once we exclude fund size in column (2), and strong 
evidence that larger funds perform significantly better (p<0.001) once we exclude fund sequence number in 
column (3). As in Kaplan and Schoar (whose dataset is a subset of ours), the relation between fund 
performance and fund size is increasing and concave, consistent with diminishing returns to scale. The 
adjusted R2 in model (3) is 13.6%.  
Because fund sequence number appears to have little effect on fund performance in our dataset, and 
because it is frequently unavailable in the Venture Economics database, we replace it with a dummy 
equaling one for first-time funds. We also control for funds that Venture Economics classifies as seed or 
early-stage funds, on the assumption that such funds invest in riskier companies and so have relatively 
fewer successful exits. The resulting model is shown in column (4). In addition to the positive and concave 
effect of fund size, we find that first-time funds perform significantly worse, mirroring Kaplan and 
Schoar’s (2005) results: All else equal, first-time funds have exit rates that are 3.6 percentage points below 
average (that is, 30.9% rather than 34.5%). In this specification, seed and early-stage funds do not perform 
differently from other funds. 
The model shown in column (5) adds the log of vintage-year VC fund inflows in an attempt to control 
for Gompers and Lerner’s (2000) “money chasing deals” result, whereby inflows of capital into VC funds 
increase the competition for a limited number of attractive investment opportunities. Consistent with the 
                                                 
22 It is difficult to control directly for exit market conditions over the life of a fund, as market conditions may vary widely 
over the 7+ years in which portfolio companies are likely to reach exit stage. The year fixed effects may help control for 
heterogeneity in exit rates related to the fund’s vintage year timing (and hence subsequent exit market conditions). See 
Section IV.C for company-level models that control explicitly for exit market conditions. 
  
18
spirit of their results, we find that funds subsequently perform significantly worse the more money flowed 
into the VC industry in the year they were raised. The effect is large economically: A one-standard-
deviation increase in vintage-year fund inflows reduces exit rates by seven percentage points from the 
34.5% estimation sample average, holding all other covariates at their sample means. Columns (6) and (7) 
add to this specification our two proxies for the investment opportunities funds faced when deploying their 
committed capital. Whether we use industry P/E ratios or industry B/M ratios, the results indicate that a 
more favorable investment climate at the time a fund invested its capital is followed by significantly higher 
exit rates. Of the two, B/M ratios have the larger economic effect, with a one-standard-deviation decrease 
in the B/M ratio among publicly traded companies in the fund’s industry of specialization being associated 
with a 7.7 percentage point increase in subsequent exit rates. The models that follow will include industry 
B/M ratios, though we note that all results are robust to using industry P/E ratios instead.  
B. The Effect of Firm Experience on Fund Performance 
From now on, we take the model shown in column (7) of Table III as our baseline fund performance 
model. Before we turn to the effect of network position on fund performance, we control for the investment 
experience of the fund’s parent firm using the four proxies described in Table I. Due to the high degree of 
correlation among the four proxies, we include them in the baseline model one at a time. In each case, the 
explanatory power of the models, shown in Table IV, improves substantially.  
However we measure it, funds with more experienced parents perform significantly better. One-
standard-deviation increases in the log number of days since the parent’s first-ever investment, the log 
number of rounds the parent has participated in, the log aggregate amount it has invested, and the log 
number of portfolio companies it has funded, each measured up to the year the VC fund was raised, 
increase exit rates by 3.7, 3.5, 4.4, and 3.3 percentage points, respectively. Note that the first-fund dummy 
loses significance in these models, indicating that it is a poor proxy for experience. 
Since the log aggregate investment amount proxy has the largest economic effect, we will use it in all 
subsequent models to proxy for the parent firm’s experience. Our results are generally robust to using any 
of the other three proxies instead. 
C. The Effect of Firm Networks on Fund Performance 
Having controlled for fund characteristics, competition for deal flow, investment opportunities, and 
  
19
parent firm experience, does a VC’s network centrality (measured over the prior five years) improve the 
performance of its fund (over the next ten years)? The results, shown in Table V, indicate that it is does. 
We estimate five separate regression models, adding our five centrality measures to the specification shown 
in column (3) of Table IV. We add them one at a time given the relatively high degree of correlation among 
them.23 Each specification in Table V suggests that better networked VC firms are associated with 
significantly better fund performance, and the adjusted R2 increases to around 19%.24  
Of the five network measures, eigenvector has the largest economic effect, closely followed by degree 
and indegree. To illustrate, a one-standard-deviation increase in these measures is associated with a more 
than two percentage point increase in exit rates, all else equal. Thus, a VC benefits from having many ties 
(degree), especially when the ties involve other well-connected VCs (eigenvector), and from being invited 
into many syndicates (indegree). Having the ability to act as a broker between other VCs (betweenness) has 
a smaller effect, with a one-standard-deviation increase in this centrality measure being associated with 
only a one percentage point increase in fund performance. This will prove to be true throughout our 
analysis, suggesting that indirect relationships (those requiring intermediation) play a lesser role in the 
venture capital market. Similarly, outdegree has a relatively small effect economically, which is consistent 
with the view that this measure captures a VC firm’s investment in future reciprocity, which takes some 
time to pay off. In other words, inviting many VCs into one’s syndicates today (i.e., high outdegree) will 
hopefully result in many co-investment opportunities for one’s future funds (i.e., high future indegree). We 
will explore this dynamic relation between indegree and outdegree further in Section VI. 
D. Reverse Causality and Performance Persistence 
We do not believe that our results are driven simply by reverse causality, i.e., that a higher fund exit 
rate enables a VC to improve its network position, rather than the other way around. Recall that we 
construct the network centrality measures from syndication data for the five years before a fund is created. 
The fact that these data can help explain fund performance over the next ten years suggests that networking 
                                                 
23 One obvious concern is that our network centrality measures merely proxy for (or are cleaner measures of) VC parent 
firm experience. However, the pairwise correlations between the experience measure and the five measures of network 
centralities are relatively low, ranging from 36.8% to 43.9%.  
24 If we restrict the sample to funds raised prior to 1995, to ensure each sample fund has completed its ten-year life, 
betweenness and outdegree cease to be significant at conventional levels. Indegree, degree, and eigenvectors continue to be 
positively and significantly related to fund performance. 
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truly affects performance.  
A potentially more serious concern is persistence in performance from fund to fund. To rule out that the 
network measures are simply proxying for omitted persistence in performance, we re-estimate our fund-
level models including among the regressors the exit rate of the VC firm’s most recent past fund. Note that 
this restricts our sample to VC firms that have raised at least two funds between 1980 and 1999; first-time 
funds and VC firms that do not raise follow-on funds are necessarily excluded.25  
The results are shown in Table VI. While we do find evidence of performance persistence, we continue 
to find that better networked VC firms enjoy better fund performance, all else equal. The economic 
magnitude of the performance persistence is large. A one-standard-deviation increase in the exit rate of the 
VC firm’s most recent past fund is associated with a 4.9 percentage point increase in the current fund’s exit 
rate. As before, the five network centrality measures affect exit rates positively, and three of them do so 
significantly. The economic magnitude remains similar: All else equal, a one-standard-deviation increase in 
network centrality is associated with a 2.3, 1.9, and 2.1 percentage point increase in fund performance, for 
indegree, degree, and eigenvectors, respectively. As in the previous analysis, outdegree and betweenness 
have a lesser effect on performance. 
E. Exit Rates and Internal Rates of Return 
To ascertain the extent to which our measure of fund performance, exit rates, relates to fund returns, we 
use a sample of fund IRRs recently disclosed by public pension plans and state universities following 
Freedom of Information Act suits. Such data are available for 188 of the 3,469 funds in our sample. While 
this sample is small and not necessarily representative, it provides us with an opportunity to partially 
examine the relation between exit rates and IRRs and thus the robustness of our fund performance results. 
The correlation between exit rates and IRRs is 0.42 (p<0.001), suggesting that exit rates are a useful but 
noisy proxy for IRRs. We re-estimate our fund-level performance models on the subsample of funds for 
which IRRs are available. (To conserve space, the results are not reported in tables.) This both weakens and 
strengthens our results. On the one hand, the coefficients estimated for outdegree, degree, and betweenness 
are no longer statistically significant. On the other, the coefficient estimates for indegree and eigenvector 
                                                 
25 We obtain similar (and somewhat stronger) results if we include all funds, setting the prior performance variable equal to 
zero for first-time funds and including a dummy variable identifying first-time funds. 
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are not only statistically significant, they are also very large economically: IRRs increase by between 11 
and 14 percentage points from the 15% sample average for one-standard-deviation increases in indegree 
and eigenvector. The adjusted R2s in all five models are high, ranging from 27.8% for the outdegree 
specification to 30% for the eigenvector specification.  
Finally, we regress IRRs on exit rates to help interpret economic significance in our exit rate models 
(results not shown). On average, funds break even (i.e., IRR=0) at an exit rate of 18.8%. Beyond 18.8%, 
each 1% increase in exit rates is associated with a 1.046% increase in IRRs (p<0.001). If we are willing to 
assume that the relation between IRRs and exit rates remains roughly one-to-one in the overall sample (for 
which we do not have IRR data), this suggests that we can translate the economic significance exercises in 
the previous sections into IRR gains on nearly a one-for-one basis. In other words, a two percentage point 
increase in exit rates (from the mean of around 35%) is roughly equivalent to a two percentage point 
increase in IRR (from a mean of around 15%). 
IV. Company-level Analysis 
We now turn to estimating the effect of VC networking on portfolio company performance. In the 
absence of company-level rates of return data, we measure company performance indirectly. In terms of 
Figure 3, we model the likelihood that a company survives – in the sense of proceeding to another funding 
round or exiting via an IPO or M&A transaction – rather than being written off.26 Our analysis focuses on 
the first three funding rounds, for the sake of brevity. While the choice of three rounds is arbitrary, our 
results do not change if we consider later rounds as well. 
The models shown in Table VII relate company survival over the first three rounds to the variables used 
to model fund performance in Table V: The characteristics of the lead investor (such as fund size and 
whether it is a first-time fund); the VC inflow proxy for competition for deal flow, measured as of the year 
in which the funding round took place; the B/M proxy for investment opportunities in the portfolio 
company’s Venture Economics industry, as of the funding year; a proxy for the lead investor’s investment 
experience (measured from the investor’s founding date to the date of the funding round); and our set of 
network measures. We measure the VC parent firm’s network centrality over the five-year window 
                                                 
26 All results in this section are robust to restricting the sample to funds raised prior to 1995, to ensure each sample fund has 
completed its ten-year life. 
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preceding the investment round. (For example, for a second round investment made in 1995, the centrality 
measures are calculated from data for the years 1991-1995.) Though not shown, we also include industry 
effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity in company-level survival rates. Recall that Venture 
Economics provides no data on company characteristics, such as sales or earnings. 
The dependent variable in Table VII is an indicator variable, equaling one if the company survived 
from round N to receive another funding round or exited successfully, and zero if it was written off after 
round N. Since we focus on survival from the first three rounds (i.e., N=1..3), we estimate three separate 
models labeled in the table as “survived round 1,” “…2,” and “…3.” Clearly, as survival to round N+1 is 
conditional on having survived to round N, the sample size decreases from round to round. (Note also that 
due to missing fund size data, there are fewer observations available for estimation than are shown in 
Figure 3.) To mitigate collinearity problems, we add the five network measures one at a time, resulting in 
15 models. All models are estimated using probit MLE. 
A. The Determinants of Portfolio Company Survival 
The pseudo R2s in Table VII decrease across the three funding rounds considered, suggesting that as 
companies become more established, company-specific variables (which we cannot control for) become 
relatively more important drivers of company survival. Our models explain approximately 9-10% of the 
variation in survival rates from round 1, 4-5% for round 2 survival, and 3-4% for round 3 survival.  
We find a significant increasing and at times concave relation between the lead investor’s fund size and 
a portfolio company’s survival from any of the first three rounds. This echoes the finding in the previous 
section that larger funds have higher exit rates. First-time funds that lead an investment round are 
associated with significantly worse survival probabilities from round 3. The more money the VC industry 
raised from investors at the time of the funding round, the less likely a portfolio company is to survive, and 
this is true across all three rounds. Interpreting fund inflows as a proxy for competition for deal flow, this 
suggests that funds make more marginal investment choices at times when investment capital is plentiful, 
leading to poorer survival records. A more favorable investment environment, as proxied by a lower 
average industry B/M ratio, significantly improves a company’s chances of survival, again across all three 
rounds. The beneficial effect of low competition and favorable investment opportunities is strongest 
economically in the first two rounds. Surprisingly, more experienced VCs are associated with a 
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significantly lower survival probability.27 
Controlling for these factors, we find, in each of the fifteen probit models, that better networked 
investors are associated with significantly higher company survival probabilities. To illustrate the economic 
magnitude, consider a one-standard-deviation increase in the lead VC’s eigenvector centrality measure. 
This increases the survival probability in the first round from the unconditional expectation of 66.8% to 
72.4%, in the second round from 77.7% to 83.4%, and in the third round from 79.2% to 86.4%. As in the 
fund-level models, the network measures capturing the number and quality of relationships (degree and 
eigenvector) and access to other VCs’ deal flow (indegree) have stronger economic effects on performance 
than do measures of future reciprocity (outdegree) and brokerage (betweenness).  
Using a sample of Canadian companies, Brander, Amit, and Antweiler (2002) find that syndicated VC 
deals have higher returns, raising the possibility that syndication itself may improve a company’s survival 
chances. If better-networked VCs are more likely to syndicate a given deal, we may be confusing the 
beneficial effects of syndication with the beneficial effect of being backed by a well-networked VC. To rule 
out this concern, we re-estimate our models adding dummy variables for (a) whether the current round was 
syndicated or (b) whether any of the company’s previous investment rounds was syndicated. To conserve 
space, the results are not reported in tables. The positive effect of our network measures on portfolio 
company survival remains robust to controlling for whether or not the deal was syndicated.  
We also re-estimate the models focusing only on rounds that were not syndicated. Here, we continue to 
find that portfolio companies benefit from receiving funding from well-networked VCs even if the 
investment itself was not syndicated. Thus, the influence a VC derives from having many syndication 
partners is useful even when the VC does not formally syndicate a given investment, which validates our 
choice of using syndication networks to proxy for the broader networks VCs operate in.  
B. Pooled Portfolio Company Survival Models 
So far, we have modeled round-by-round survival. We now take the panel nature of the data explicitly 
into account. We track each sample company from its first funding round across all rounds to the earlier of 
its exit or November 2003. The dependent variable equals one in round N if the company survived to round 
                                                 
27 This is based on using invested dollars to proxy for investment experience. Results are robust to using any of the other 
three experience proxies.  
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N+1. Unless it subsequently exited via an IPO or M&A transaction, the dependent variable is zero in the 
company’s last recorded round. All models are estimated using panel probit estimators with random 
company effects. The panel is unbalanced since portfolio companies receive varying numbers of funding 
rounds. We estimate five models, including the five network measures one at a time. As before, network 
centrality is measured from the VC syndication network over the five-year window preceding the 
investment round. Note that the identity of the lead investor is allowed to change across rounds.  
The results are reported in Table VIII. Irrespective of which aspect of the lead investor’s network 
connections we control for, we find a significant increasing and concave relation between the lead 
investor’s fund size and a portfolio company’s survival. Greater VC fund inflows and a less favorable 
investment environment significantly reduce a company’s chances of survival, as before. The effect of the 
lead investor’s investment experience, measured as the lead investor’s log aggregate amount invested, 
again reduces a company’s survival chances in each of the five specifications.  
Controlling for these factors, we find that a portfolio company’s survival probability increases 
significantly, the better networked its lead investor. This is true for all five centrality measures. Except for 
betweenness, the economic effect in each case is large. A one-standard-deviation increase in the other four 
centrality measures is associated with a 6.6 to 8.2 percentage point increase from the unconditional survival 
probability of 66.8%, holding all other covariates at their sample means. 
C. Portfolio Company Exit 
Finally, we equate good performance with a successful exit (ignoring survival to another funding 
round) and ask whether the VC firm’s network centrality helps accelerate a portfolio company’s exit.28 For 
this purpose, we compute the number of quarters between a company’s first funding round and the earlier 
of a) its exit, b) the end of the VC fund’s ten-year life, and c) November 2003. Companies that have not 
exited by the fund’s tenth anniversary are assumed to have been liquidated. Companies backed by funds 
that are in existence beyond November 2003 are treated as “right-censored” (to allow for the possibility 
that they may yet exit successfully after the end of our sample period). Allowing for right-censoring, the 
average time-to-exit in our sample is 24 quarters.  
                                                 
28 Econometrically, this is similar in spirit to Hellmann and Puri (2000) who investigate whether VC backing reduces the 
time it takes a start-up company to bring its product to market. 
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We relate the log time-to-exit to our network measures controlling for fund and firm characteristics, 
competition for deal flow and investment opportunities at the time of the company’s first funding round, 
and conditions in the stock market in general and the IPO and M&A markets in particular. Market 
conditions are allowed to vary over time, to allow VC firms to react to improvements in (say) IPO 
conditions by taking a portfolio company public. We proxy for conditions in the stock market using the 
quarterly return on the NASDAQ Composite Index. To measure exit market conditions, we use the 
quarterly log number of IPOs and the quarterly log number of M&A deals in the portfolio company’s 
Venture Economics industry. All three variables are lagged by a quarter, to allow for the necessary delay in 
preparing a company for exit. 
Our time-to-exit models are estimated in the form of accelerated-time-to-failure models.29 These are 
hazard (or duration) models written with log time as the dependent variable. Parametric hazard models 
require that we specify a distribution for log time. While our results are robust to alternative choices, we 
assume that log time is normally distributed. This has the advantage that the hazard rate (the instantaneous 
probability of exiting in the next instance given that a company has not exited so far) first increases and 
then decreases over time. Other distributions imply either a constant hazard rate (e.g., exponential) or 
hazards that increase (or decrease) monotonically over time (e.g., Weibull or Gompertz). In the context of 
VC investments, monotonic hazard functions are implausible: It is neither the case that companies are 
never more likely to exit than at the time of their first round (a monotonically decreasing hazard function) 
nor that companies become ever more likely to exit the longer they have languished in the VC’s portfolio (a 
monotonically increasing hazard function).30  
The results are reported in Table IX. While fund size has no effect on time-to-exit, we find that first-
time funds exit their portfolio companies significantly faster, in around 20.5 rather than 24 quarters, all else 
equal. This is consistent with Gompers’ (1996) finding that younger funds “grandstand” by taking portfolio 
companies public as early as possible. Companies that received their first funding at a time when a lot of 
                                                 
29 We obtain qualitatively similar results if we estimate simple probits of whether or not a portfolio company exits 
successfully. However, probits have two shortcomings in our setting. They cannot account for the right-censoring caused 
by the fact that some funds remain active beyond the November 2003 end of our sample period; and they cannot easily 
accommodate controls for exit market conditions, since it is unclear at what point in time such conditions should be 
measured in the case of companies that do not exit. 
30 A way of avoiding a specific distribution is to estimate semi-parametric Cox models. This does not affect our results. 
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money flowed into the VC industry (interpreted as increased competition for deal flow) or when industry 
book-to-market ratios were low (interpreted as relatively poor investment opportunities) take significantly 
longer to exit. More experienced VC firms exit their portfolio companies significantly faster. These results 
mirror those in the previous tables. In addition, we find that higher returns on the NASDAQ Composite 
Index and an increase in the number of IPOs (but not M&A deals) are associated with a significant increase 
in the probability that a portfolio company will exit in the next quarter. This is consistent with Lerner’s 
(1994b) findings. 
Controlling for these effects, we find that each of the five centrality measures has a negative and 
significant effect on time-to-exit. Eigenvector has the largest effect economically. A one-standard-deviation 
increase in the lead VC’s eigenvector centrality is associated with a two-quarter decrease from the 
unconditional time-to-exit of 24 quarters. The corresponding effects for the three degree network measures 
are around one quarter. Thus, companies benefit from being backed by VCs who have many ties (degree), 
especially when these ties involve other well-connected VCs (eigenvector).  
V. Further Robustness Tests 
A. Robustness to Alternative Explanations 
We now investigate an alternative hypothesis for the positive relation between exits and network 
centrality found in Sections III and IV. Better networked VCs may be able to take more marginal 
companies public, thus generating the appearance of better performance as measured by the VC’s exit rate 
or a portfolio company’s survival probability, but which would presumably not be reflected in actual 
investment returns (which we do not observe). To test this alternative hypothesis, we focus on two quality 
indicators: Whether the portfolio company had positive net earnings when it went public, and whether it 
survived the first three years of trading on the public markets.  
We gather data on earnings for the last 12 month (LTM) period before the IPO from Compustat31 and 
supplement these data with LTM earnings from Thomson Financial’s SDC IPO database as well as hard 
copies of IPO prospectuses where necessary. We then sort all 16,315 portfolio companies that received 
their first institutional round of funding from a sample VC fund between 1980 and 1999 into quartiles 
                                                 
31 Compustat backfills data when companies go public. 
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based on the network centrality of their lead first-round VC. Contrary to the alternative hypothesis, the best 
networked VCs take companies public that are less likely to have negative earnings at the time of the IPO. 
For instance, 51% of companies in the highest quartile by degree have negative pre-IPO earnings vs. nearly 
two-thirds of companies in the lowest quartile. This suggests that being well-networked either helps the VC 
select more promising companies to begin with, or allows the VC to add more value to the start-up 
resulting in a higher-quality company by the time of the IPO. Either of these interpretations is consistent 
with the motivation for our study. 
Next, we estimate the probability that a company has negative earnings at the time of the IPO, as a 
function of fund characteristics, proxies for competition for deal flow and investment opportunities, fund 
experience, and our measures of how well networked each fund’s parent firm is. We find no significant 
relation between four of the five network centrality measures and the probability of having negative 
earnings at the time of the IPO (not reported).32  
To investigate post-IPO survival, we code a company as delisting involuntarily if CRSP has assigned it 
a delisting code in the 400s or 500s and the delisting date occurs on or before the third anniversary of the 
IPO.33 Of the 2,527 sample companies that go public by November 2003, 7% are delisted involuntarily.34 
We again sort the sample into quartiles by the lead VC’s network centrality and find a positive relation 
between firm quality and the lead VC’s network centrality, contrary to what we would expect under the 
alternative hypothesis. For instance, 4.9% of companies backed by the VCs with the highest outdegree are 
delisted involuntarily within three years of going public vs. 10.5% of companies backed by the worst-
networked VCs. 
When we estimate probit models of the likelihood that a firm delists involuntarily within three years of 
going public (as a function of fund characteristics, proxies for competition for deal flow and investment 
opportunities, fund experience, and our measures of how well networked each fund’s parent firm is), we 
also find no support for the alternative hypothesis. The only variables predicting delisting are the proxy for 
                                                 
32 The exception is indegree which has a positive and significant coefficient. We interpret this as providing at best weak 
support for the alternative hypothesis. 
33 Following standard practice, mergers and exchange offers are not classified as involuntary delisting events. 
34 Note that as we do not have a full three-year window for very recent IPOs, it is conceivable that this understates the 
delisting rate somewhat. On the other hand, there were extremely few VC-backed IPOs in 2001-2003. 
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competition for deal flow and the lead VC’s investment experience: Companies funded at times when more 
money was raised by the VC industry have a significantly higher delisting probability,35 while companies 
backed by more experienced VCs have a significantly lower delisting probability. 
In conclusion, better-networked VCs do not appear to be associated with lower-quality IPO exits (as 
measured by earnings at the time of the IPO and subsequent survival). 
B. Location- and Industry-specific Networks  
The network measures we have used thus far implicitly assume that each VC in the U.S. potentially has 
ties to every other VC in the U.S.  To the extent that VC networks in truth are more geographically 
concentrated, or involve only VCs specializing in a certain industry, we may underestimate a VC’s network 
centrality. For instance, a given biotech VC firm may be central in a network of biotech VCs, but may lack 
connections to non-biotech VCs in the overall network of U.S.-based VCs. Similarly, a VC firm 
headquartered in Silicon Valley may be well connected in California but not in a network that includes East 
Coast VC firms. 
To assess the robustness of our findings we have re-estimated all our models using centrality measures 
derived from (a) industry-specific networks defined using the six broad Venture Economics industries, and 
(b) a network of Californian VC firms. (We refrain from constructing networks for other geographic areas 
due to the comparatively small number of VC firms in areas outside California.) In each case, we continue 
to construct the networks on the basis of trailing five-year windows. To conserve space, we do not report 
the results in tables.  
Using industry-specific networks slightly strengthens our fund-level results, in the sense of both higher 
adjusted R2s and larger economic effects. For instance, a one-standard-deviation increase in a firm’s 
indegree increases its funds’ exit rates by 2.5 percentage points in the industry-specific models, compared 
to 2.2 percentage points using the overall network. In the company-level models, our results are 
qualitatively unchanged compared to Tables VII through IX, and the industry network measures do not 
obviously dominate the overall network measures.  
Restricting the network to Californian VCs reduces the sample of funds to 872 funds (for which all 
                                                 
35 This is consistent with the “money chasing deals” phenomenon of Gompers and Lerner (2000) resulting in more marginal 
companies being funded by the VC industry. 
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necessary variables are available) and the sample of portfolio companies to 4,691. The network measures 
continue to improve fund performance significantly, and the economic magnitude of the effects is 
considerably larger than before: On the order of 4-5 percentage point improvements in fund exit rates (from 
the unconditional mean of 35.7%), compared to around two percentage points in the overall sample. In the 
company-level models, our network measures continue to be positively and significantly related to 
company survival and exit probabilities, and the economic magnitude of the effects is similar to the models 
shown in Tables VII through IX.  
VI. How do VC Firms Become Networked? 
Our results so far suggest that VC firms that occupy more central, or influential, positions in the VC 
network enjoy better investment performance, both at the fund and the portfolio company level. But how 
do VC firms become networked in the first place? It seems likely that an emerging track record of 
successful investing makes a VC firm a more desirable syndication partner in the future, which in turn will 
improve its network position over time. Such a track record might be built around successful portfolio 
exits, particularly eye-catching IPOs, or – according to conversations we have had with venture capitalists – 
the ability to persuade unrelated VCs to lead a follow-on funding round for a portfolio company.  
To explore the evolution of a first-time VC firm’s network position empirically, we model its network 
centrality in year t (using each of the five centrality measures as the dependent variable) as a function of the 
log number of portfolio companies that it exited via an IPO or an M&A transaction in year t-1; the log 
number of portfolio companies that received follow-on funding in year t-1 in a round led by an outside VC 
(defined as a VC firm that was not already an investor in the portfolio company); and its accumulated 
investment experience in year t-1 (using the log aggregate dollar amount it has invested since inception).36 
To control for how “eye-catching” its IPOs were, we also include the average degree of underpricing of its 
prior-year IPOs. Finally, we control for the fact that a VC firm’s network position may naturally slip as the 
network grows in size, by including the log number of new funds raised during the year.  
                                                 
36 Our results are robust to using longer lags, though we lose observations. 
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We expect persistence in a VC firm’s network position, in part because economically, relationships 
take time to establish but once they are, they likely endure over time; and in part due to the way we 
construct the network measures. Therefore, we estimate dynamic panel data models under the assumption 
that the errors follow an AR(1) process. To control for unobserved heterogeneity in firm characteristics, 
such as skill or personal contacts, we include firm fixed effects, and we allow for unbalanced panels to 
capture the fact that some VC firms are in the sample for longer than others. The resulting estimator is due 
to Baltagi and Wu (1999). The results are reported in columns (1) through (5) of Table X. 
The models have high pseudo-R2s, ranging from 17.6% for the betweenness model to 28.7% for the 
indegree model. Auto-correlation is around 83%, consistent with persistence in network position. The firm 
fixed effects are significant throughout, suggesting that there is VC firm-specific heterogeneity omitted 
from the specification. Likely candidates are investment skill and personal network contacts VCs may have 
acquired through prior employment at an established VC firm.  
Across all five models, first-time funds improve their network positions as they become more 
experienced through time. Growth in the size of the network generally has no effect on centrality, though a 
VC firm’s eigenvector centrality actually improves as more new funds enter the industry. Controlling for 
these factors, we find that a VC firm’s network position is unrelated to the number of portfolio companies it 
has exited through an IPO or M&A transaction, with one exception: In the case of outdegree, we find a 
statistically weak relation to the lagged number of IPOs and a stronger relation to the lagged number of 
M&A deals. One plausible interpretation for this finding is that a VC firm has to prove its ability to find 
and produce winners before many other VCs will accept invitations into its syndicates. 
Refinancings lead-managed by outside VC, on the other hand, have the conjectured positive and 
significant effect on a VC firm’s future network position in all five models.  
The evidence on how eye-catching the VC firm’s prior-year IPOs were varies in magnitude and 
significance across the five models. For indegree, degree, and eigenvector, higher underpricing is 
associated with subsequent improvement in the VC firm’s network position. When we use other plausible 
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proxies for eye-catching IPOs (such as the average first-day market capitalization of the VC firm’s IPOs, 
to capture “home runs”), we find no relation to network position (results not shown). The same is true when 
we attempt to make allowance for the quality (rather than quantity) of a VC firm’s exits using the quality 
measures explored in Section V.A (such as the fraction of IPOs with negative earnings at the time of the 
IPO or that were delisted within three years, lagged appropriately) and the average three-year post-IPO 
buy-and-hold abnormal return of the firm’s IPOs. 
Finally, we investigate the dynamic relation between outdegree and indegree. In Section III, we argued 
that outdegree may have a relatively smaller economic effect on fund performance than the other network 
measures because it captures a VC firm’s investment in future reciprocity, which takes some time to pay 
off. The dynamic models in Table X enable us to test this conjecture formally, by using lagged outdegree to 
explain the evolution of a VC firm’s indegree. The model shown in column (6) uses a one-year lag of 
outdegree, though we note that our results are robust to using three- or five-year lags instead. The positive 
and significant coefficient estimated for lagged outdegree is consistent with the notion that inviting many 
VCs into one’s syndicates in the past results in many co-investment opportunities in the future. Thus, high 
indegree today does appear to reflect, in part, payback on past investment in reciprocity.  
VII. Conclusions 
Many financial markets are characterized by strong relationships and networks, rather than arm’s-
length, spot-market transactions. We examine the performance consequences of this organizational choice 
in the context of relationships established when VCs syndicate portfolio company investments. We use a 
comprehensive sample of U.S. based VCs over the period 1980 to 2003. To the best of our knowledge, this 
is the first study to examine the relation between fund and portfolio company performance and measures of 
networking among VCs.  
Controlling for known determinants of VC investment performance, we find that VC funds whose 
parent firms enjoy more influential network positions have significantly better performance, as measured 
by the proportion of portfolio investments that are successfully exited through an initial public offering or a 
sale to another company. Similarly, the portfolio companies of better networked VC firms are significantly 
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more likely to survive to subsequent rounds of financing and to eventual exit. The magnitude of these 
effects is economically large, and is robust to a wide range of specifications.  
Economically, VC firms benefit the most from having a wide range of relationships, especially if these 
involve other well-networked VC firms, and from having access to other VCs’ deal flow. One way to gain 
access to deal flow is for a VC firm to invite other VCs into its syndicates today, which over time appears 
to lead to reciprocal co-investment opportunities. The network measure with the least economic 
significance is betweenness, which captures a VC firm’s ability to act as a broker between other VCs. This 
suggests that indirect relationships (those requiring intermediation) play a lesser role in the venture capital 
market. Interestingly, once we control for network effects, the importance of how much investment 
experience a VC has is reduced, and in some specifications, eliminated.  
Our analysis provides a first look at the economic importance of networks as a choice of organizational 
form in the venture capital industry. We leave for future research the question how networking affects 
performance in other financial markets, such as syndicated lending, bond or equity underwriting, and 
investment bank-institutional investor relationships. 
If more highly networked VCs enjoy better investment performance, our findings have ramifications 
for institutional investors choosing which VC fund to invest in. Additionally, our analysis provides a deeper 
understanding of the possible drivers of cross-sectional performance of VC funds. Our findings also shed 
light on the industrial organization of the VC market. Given the large returns to being well-networked we 
document, enhancing one’s network position should be an important strategic consideration for an 
incumbent VC, while presenting a potential barrier to entry for new VCs.  
Finally, our finding that better networked VCs enjoy superior performance raises the question of how 
VCs become networked in the first place. Our evidence suggests that an emerging track record of 
successful investing (as proxied by the ability to persuade unrelated VCs to lead-manage a follow-on 
funding round for a portfolio company) improves a VC firm’s network position over time. However, many 
central questions remain for future research. For instance, VCs likely benefit from personal network ties 
which we have not so far taken account of. More broadly, what determines a VC’s choice whether or not to 
network? What are the costs associated with becoming well-networked? And how does one form 
relationships with influential VCs in the network? 
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Appendix: Network Analysis Example 
To illustrate the application of network analysis tools to VC syndication networks, consider a network 
of four VCs labeled A, B, C, and D. Suppose their syndication history is as follows: 
• Syndicate 1: C (lead), D 
• Syndicate 2: C (lead), A, B 
• Syndicate 3: A (lead), C 
• Syndicate 4: B (lead), A 
Graphically, these can be represented as follows: 
 
 
 
 
The corresponding adjacency matrix is  
 Syndicate members 
 A B C D 
A - 1 1 0 
B 1 - 1 0 
C 1 1 - 1 
L
ea
d 
V
C
 
D 0 0 1 - 
 
Note that the matrix is symmetric. It reflects the “undirected” ties between the VCs (i.e., ignoring the 
direction of the ties). Each cell is coded one or zero, to denote the presence or absence of a syndication 
relationship, respectively. The following “directed” adjacency matrix accounts for the difference between 
leading a syndicate and being a non-lead member: 
 Syndicate members 
 A B C D 
A - 0 1 0 
B 1 - 0 0 
C 1 1 - 1 
L
ea
d 
V
C
 
D 0 0 0 - 
 
A B
DC
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Here, row vectors record syndicate leadership while column vectors record syndicate membership, and the 
matrix is no longer symmetric. The row vectors show that A has led (at least) one syndicate in which C was 
a member, B has led at least one syndicate in which A was a member, C has led one syndicate each in 
which A, B and D were members, and D has led no syndicates. The column vectors show that A has been a 
(non-lead) member of syndicates led by B and C, B has been a (non-lead) member of syndicate(s) led by C, 
C has been a (non-lead) member of syndicate(s) led by A, and D has been a (non-lead) member of 
syndicate(s) led by C.  
Intuitively, C appears the best connected: C leads more syndicates than the other VCs, participates in 
more syndicates than any VC except A (with whom C ties), and is the only VC to have syndicated with D. 
Thus, C is said to have greater “centrality,” in the sense of having a highly favored position in the network 
giving access to information, deal flow, deeper pools of capital, contacts, expertise, and so on. C’s only 
apparent shortcoming (in this network) is the fact that it is not often (invited to be) present in syndicates led 
by the other VCs.  
The five centrality measures used in our study are calculated from the two adjacency matrices, and are 
summarized for the four VCs in the following table: 
 
VC 
Normalized 
degree 
Normalized 
indegree 
Normalized 
outdegree 
Normalized 
eigenvector 
Normalized 
betweenness 
A 66.67% 66.67 33.33 73.92 0.00 
B 66.67 33.33 33.33 73.92 0.00 
C 100.00 33.33 100.00 86.50 66.67 
D 33.33 33.33 0.00 39.86 0.00 
 
Degree counts the number of undirected ties an actor has, by summing the actor’s row (or column) 
vector in the undirected adjacency matrix. In our setting, this is the number of (unique) VCs with which a 
VC has syndicated deals. Thus, A’s degree is 2, B’s is 2, C’s is 3, and D’s is 1. Clearly, degree is a function 
of network size, which in our dataset varies over time. To ensure comparability over time, we normalize 
degree by dividing by the maximum possible degree in an n-actor network. With n=4, a given VC can be 
tied to at most three other unique VCs. This gives normalized degrees of 66.67%, 66.67%, 100% and 
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33.33% for A, B, C, and D, respectively. By this measure, C is the most central and D the least central VC 
in the network. 
Degree does not distinguish between initiating and receiving ties, or in our context, between leading a 
syndicate or simply participating in it. Indegree counts the number of directed ties an actor received, by 
summing the actor’s column vector in the directed adjacency matrix. In our setting, this is the number of 
unique VCs that have led syndicates in which the VC was invited to participate as a non-lead member. A’s 
indegree of 2 (or 66.67% when normalized) is the highest in the network. Outdegree measures the number 
of ties an actor initiates, by summing the actor’s row vector. In our setting, this is the number of unique 
VCs that have participated as (non-lead) members in syndicates led by the VC in question. C’s outdegree is 
3 (or 100% when normalized), reflecting the fact that C has involved every other VC in its syndicates at 
least once.  
A popular measure of closeness in large networks is eigenvector centrality (Bonacich (1972, 1987)). It 
attempts to find the most central actors by taking into account the centrality of the actors each actor is tied 
to. It is computed by taking the (scaled) elements of the eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue 
of the adjacency matrix. This yields eigenvector centrality measures of 0.523, 0.523, 0.612 and 0.282 for A, 
B, C, and D, respectively. These can be normalized by dividing by the maximum possible eigenvector 
element value for a four-actor network, yielding normalized eigenvector centrality measures of 73.92%, 
73.92%, 86.5% and 39.86% for A, B, C, and D, respectively. 
Finally, betweenness measures the proportion of shortest-distance paths between other actors in the 
network that the actor in question lies upon. Imagine a star-shaped network, with one actor connected to all 
other actors, none of whom is connected to anyone else. Clearly, the actor at the center of the star stands 
“between” all other actors. In our undirected matrix, C occupies such a position with respect to D: A can 
reach B and C directly, but must go through C to reach D; B can reach A and C directly, but must also go 
through C to reach D; and D can reach C directly, but must go through C to reach either of A or B. Thus, A, 
B, and D have zero betweenness while C stands between D and A and between D and B and so has a 
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betweenness measure of 2. The maximum betweenness in a four-actor network is three,37 so the normalized 
betweenness measures are 0% for A, B and D, and 66.67% for C.  
It is clear from the table that C is the most central VC in the network by all measures save indegree. 
This reflects the fact that C is connected to every VC in the network, whereas the other VCs are not, and 
the fact that C is present in almost every syndicate that was formed, and led most of the syndicates. C’s 
relatively low indegree suggests it is not invited to join many deals (though it may also reflect C’s tendency 
to lead deals). C’s high degree and eigenvector centrality measures reflect its central position, or 
importance, in the network. Similarly, C’s high betweenness reflects its potential role as a “broker” in the 
network, in that C is the sole connector between D and the other VCs.  
This example illustrates the importance of considering more than one measure of a VC’s centrality, as 
each captures certain unique elements of the VC’s ties to other VCs. That said, it also provides an 
indication of the fact that despite these differences, these five centrality measures are still likely to be 
highly correlated with each other. 
                                                 
37 To illustrate this, consider the network taking the form of a “Y,” where actors A, C and D sit on the three end points of 
the “Y” and actor B sits at the center. This is the network configuration that provides the highest number of shortest-
distance paths upon which a single actor sits, in this case actor B, who sits upon the shortest-distance paths from A to C, 
from A to D, and from C to D.  
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Figure 1. Network of Biotech VC firms, 1990-1994 
The figure shows the network that arises from syndication of portfolio company investments by biotech-focused VC firms 
over the five-year window 1990-1994. For tractability purposes, VC firms with no syndication relationships over the time 
period are excluded from the graph. Nodes on the graph represent VC firms, and arrows represent syndicate ties between 
them. The direction of the arrow represents the lead-non-lead relationship between syndicate members. The arrow points 
from the VC leading the syndicate to the non-lead member. Two-directional arrows indicate that both VCs on the arrow have 
at one point in the time window led a syndicate in which the other was a non-lead member.  
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Figure 2. Mean Exit Rates by Fund Vintage Year 
The fund-level sample consists of 3,469 venture capital funds headquartered in the U.S. that were started between 1980 and 
1999. The figure shows the average exit rate by the year a fund was raised (its vintage year). Exit rates are defined as the 
fraction of a fund’s portfolio companies that have been successfully exited via an initial public offering (IPO) or a sale to 
another company (M&A), as of November 2003.  
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Figure 3.  
The company-level sample consists of 16,315 portfolio companies that received their first institutional round of funding 
(according to Venture Economics) from a sample VC fund between 1980 and 1999. We track each company through 
November 2003, recording whether it received further funding or exited via an IPO or M&A transaction. The figure shows 
the number of companies over the first five rounds, as well as the number of exits and write-offs. The median company 
receives two funding rounds. 
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Table I. Descriptive Statistics 
The sample consists of 3,469 venture capital funds headquartered in the U.S. that were started between 1980 and 1999 (the 
“vintage years”). Fund size is the amount of committed capital reported in the Venture Economics database. Sequence 
number denotes whether a fund is the first, second and so forth fund raised by a particular VC management firm. The 
classification into seed or early-stage funds follows Venture Economics’ fund focus variable. Absent data on fund returns, we 
measure a fund’s performance by its exit rate, defined as the fraction of its portfolio companies that have been successfully 
exited via an initial public offering (IPO) or a sale to another company (M&A), as of November 2003. We also report dollar 
exit rates, defined as the fraction of the portfolio by invested dollars that has been successfully exited. The four controls for 
the investment experience of a sample fund’s parent (management) firm are based on the parent’s investment activities 
measured between the parent’s creation and the fund’s vintage year. By definition, the experience measures are zero for first-
time funds. The network measures are derived from adjacency matrices constructed using all VC syndicates over the five 
years prior to a sample fund’s vintage year. We view networks as existing among VC management firms, not among VC 
funds, so that a newly-raised fund can benefit from its parent’s pre-existing network connections. A management firm’s 
outdegree is the number of unique VCs that have participated as non-lead investors in syndicates lead-managed by the firm. 
(The lead investor is identified as the fund that invests the largest amount in the portfolio company.) A firm’s indegree is the 
number of unique VCs that have led syndicates the firm was a non-lead member of. A firm’s degree is the number of unique 
VCs it has syndicated with (regardless of syndicate role). Eigenvector measures how close to all other VCs a given VC is. 
Betweenness is the number of shortest-distance paths between other VCs in the network upon which the VC sits. Each 
network measure is normalized by the theoretical maximum (e.g., the degree of a VC who has syndicated with every other 
VC in the network.) The VC inflows variable is the aggregate amount of capital raised by other VC funds in the sample 
fund’s vintage year. P/E and B/M are the price/earnings and book/market ratios of public companies in the sample fund’s 
industry of interest. We take a fund’s industry of interest to be the Venture Economics industry that accounts for the largest 
share of its portfolio, based on dollars invested. Venture Economics classifies portfolio companies into the following six 
industries: biotechnology, communications and media, computer related, medical/health/life science, semiconductors/other 
electronics, and non-high-technology. We map public-market P/E and B/M ratios to these industries based on four-digit SIC 
codes. The ratios are value-weighted averages measured over a sample fund’s first three years of existence, to control for 
investment opportunities during the fund’s most active investment phase.  
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Table I. Descriptive Statistics (continued) 
 
 No. Mean Std. dev. Min Median Max 
Fund characteristics       
fund size ($m) 3,105 64.0 169.2 0.1 20.0 5,000 
sequence number 2,242 3.4 3.7 1 2 32 
first fund (fraction, %) 3,469 25.1     
seed or early-stage fund (fraction, %) 3,469 36.5     
Fund performance       
exit rate (% of portfolio companies exited) 3,469 34.2 29.2 0 33.3 100 
    IPO rate (% of portfolio companies sold via IPO) 3,469 20.7 25.1 0 13.6 100 
    M&A rate (% of portfolio companies sold via M&A) 3,469 13.6 18.7 0 8.5 100 
dollar exit rate (% of invested $ exited) 3,411 35.8 32.3 0 30.6 100 
    dollar IPO rate (% of invested $ exited via IPO) 3,411 22.2 28.2 0 10.6 100 
    dollar M&A rate (% of invested $ exited via M&A) 3,411 13.6 20.9 0 5.3 100 
 
Fund parent’s experience (as of vintage year)       
days since parent’s first investment 3,469 1,701 2,218 0 486 9,130 
no. of rounds parent has participated in so far 3,469 76.6 199.4 0 5 2,292 
aggregate amount parent has invested so far ($m) 3,469 71.7 249.6 0 4.9 6,564 
no. of portfolio companies parent has invested in so far 3,469 30.8 65.3 0 4 601 
Network measures (as of vintage year)       
outdegree  3,469 1.203 2.463 0 0.099 22.91
indegree  3,469 1.003 1.671 0 0.210 13.54
degree 3,469 4.237 6.355 0 1.245 41.29
betweenness  3,469 0.285 0.750 0 0.004 7.16
eigenvector 3,469 3.742 5.188 0 1.188 30.96
Competition       
VC inflows in fund’s vintage year ($bn) 3,469 23.842 29.349 2.295 6.474 84.632
Investment opportunities       
average P/E ratio in fund’s first 3 years  3,469 16.4 3.7 8.5 16.1 27.1 
average B/M ratio in fund’s first 3 years 3,469 0.514 0.237 0.177 0.526 1.226
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Table II. Network Density and Centralization Over Time 
The network characteristics of the VC industry are measured in rolling five-year windows. In each window, we count the number of VC firms that lead-manage a portfolio 
company, the total number of VCs that participate in investment rounds, and the number of investment rounds. For instance, in 1976-1980, 374 VC firms participated in 
1,541 investment rounds, 243 of whom acted one or more times as lead investor. For each window, we construct two matrices. The cells in the “directed” matrix record 
whether VC firm i participated in one or more investment rounds lead-managed by VC firm j. The cells in the “undirected” matrix record whether VC firms i and j co-
invested in one or more portfolio companies (regardless of who was the lead VC). The density of the resulting ties are reported as a proportion of all ties that could be 
present (which increases in network size). Network centralization measures the inequality in the VCs’ network positions. It is computed as the observed variation in the five 
centrality measures defined in Table I relative to the variation in the most unequal network (a perfect star) of equivalent size.  
 
     Density of ties (% of theoretical max.)  Network centralization 
 Number of ...  undirected ties directed ties   (% of theoretical max.) 
Estimation 
window 
lead VC 
firms VC firms 
investment 
rounds  mean s.d.  mean s.d.   outdegree indegree 
degree 
centrality 
between-
ness 
eigen-
vectors 
1976-1980 243 374 1,541 3.7 19.0 0.8 9.0  10.5 6.2 25.1 6.4 28.0 
1977-1981 308 496 2,267 3.7 18.8 0.7 8.6  10.8 7.6 29.8 6.9 25.9 
1978-1982 398 638 3,256 3.5 18.4 0.7 8.3  10.8 7.6 30.8 6.4 23.2 
1979-1983 499 807 4,436 3.6 18.7 0.7 8.2  14.1 9.8 34.4 6.4 20.3 
1980-1984 589 952 5,750 3.5 18.4 0.7 8.1  15.8 10.3 36.1 6.6 19.2 
1981-1985 654 1,061 6,876 3.5 18.3 0.7 8.0  16.4 10.8 37.7 6.8 18.5 
1982-1986 714 1,115 7,805 4.1 19.9 0.7 8.3  16.1 11.8 37.8 6.4 17.5 
1983-1987 703 1,092 8,702 4.0 19.6 0.8 8.8  17.5 12.9 37.5 5.7 16.5 
1984-1988 690 1,057 9,117 4.1 19.9 0.8 9.1  17.5 12.7 35.8 4.8 16.5 
1985-1989 653 1,007 9,387 4.2 20.0 0.9 9.4  16.4 12.2 36.2 5.1 16.9 
1986-1990 622 927 9,517 4.5 20.6 1.0 9.8  16.0 11.8 33.3 4.1 16.7 
1987-1991 558 847 9,206 4.5 20.7 1.0 9.9  18.9 9.7 33.1 4.7 17.8 
1988-1992 527 788 8,965 4.4 20.4 1.0 10.0  21.6 10.7 33.7 5.5 18.8 
1989-1993 495 730 8,561 4.2 20.0 1.0 9.9  21.9 11.1 34.1 6.4 20.7 
1990-1994 468 696 8,147 3.9 19.3 1.0 9.7  21.0 10.6 33.4 6.7 22.4 
1991-1995 551 815 8,342 2.8 16.5 0.7 8.3  17.8 9.8 30.6 7.2 23.7 
1992-1996 700 965 9,656 2.2 14.7 0.6 7.4  14.4 8.9 26.3 6.1 23.2 
1993-1997 869 1,134 11,324 1.8 13.4 0.5 6.8  13.1 8.2 23.9 6.0 23.1 
1994-1998 1,098 1,375 14,087 1.5 12.2 0.4 6.2  11.7 7.0 20.4 4.3 21.8 
1995-1999 1,405 1,812 18,093 1.4 11.6 0.3 5.7  10.9 6.6 19.0 3.7 19.1 
1996-2000 1,842 2,325 24,381 1.2 11.1 0.3 5.4  10.5 6.7 21.7 4.5 18.5 
1997-2001 1,966 2,483 26,551 1.2 11.0 0.3 5.4  10.4 7.2 22.9 4.9 18.9 
1998-2002 2,009 2,580 26,727 1.2 10.8 0.3 5.3  10.3 7.1 23.8 5.9 19.2 
1999-2003 1,927 2,518 25,228 1.2 11.0 0.3 5.3  10.3 7.0 24.1 6.0 19.7 
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Table III. Benchmark Determinants of Fund Performance  
The sample consists of 3,469 venture capital funds headquartered in the U.S. that were started between 1980 and 1999. The 
dependent variable is a fund’s exit rate, defined as the fraction of a fund’s portfolio companies that have been successfully 
exited via an initial public offering (IPO) or a sale to another company (M&A), as of November 2003. Exit rates average 
34.2% in the overall sample of 3,469 funds, and 34.5% in the estimation sample of 3,105 funds for which all required data 
are available. All results in this and the following tables are robust to computing exit rates using the fraction of invested 
dollars that are successfully exited instead. Sequence number denotes whether a fund is the first, second and so forth fund 
raised by a particular VC management firm. Sequence numbers are missing in Venture Economics for a third of the funds. 
The classification into seed or early-stage funds follows Venture Economics’ fund focus variable. The VC inflows variable is 
the aggregate amount of capital raised by other VC funds in the year the sample fund was raised (its vintage year). P/E and 
B/M are the price/earnings and book/market ratios of public companies in the sample fund’s industry of interest. We take a 
fund’s industry of interest to be the Venture Economics industry that accounts for the largest share of the fund’s portfolio, 
based on dollars invested. Venture Economics classifies portfolio companies into the following six industries: biotechnology, 
communications and media, computer related, medical/health/life science, semiconductors/other electronics, and non-high-
technology. We map public-market P/E and B/M ratios to these industries based on four-digit SIC codes. The ratios are 
value-weighted averages measured over a sample fund’s first three years of existence, to control for investment opportunities 
during the fund’s most active investment phase. All models are estimated using ordinary least-squares. Year dummies 
controlling for vintage year effects are included but not reported. They are jointly significant but their exclusion does not 
affect our results. Intercepts are not shown. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are shown in italics. (Results 
are robust to clustering the standard errors on firm id instead.) We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level (two-sided), respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
Fund characteristics         
ln fund size 0.024  0.038*** 0.046*** 0.046***  0.043*** 0.039***
 0.016  0.011 0.011 0.011  0.011 0.011 
ln fund size squared -0.001  -0.003* -0.004** -0.004**  -0.004** -0.003** 
 0.002  0.002 0.002 0.002  0.002 0.0015 
ln sequence number 0.017 0.026*       
 0.016 0.016       
ln sequence number squared 0.004 0.003       
 0.007 0.007       
=1 if first fund    -0.036*** -0.036***  -0.037*** -0.038***
    0.010 0.010  0.010 0.010 
=1 if seed or early-stage fund    -0.006 -0.006  -0.009 -0.021** 
    0.010 0.010  0.010 0.010 
Competition         
ln VC inflows in fund’s vintage year     -0.063***  -0.065*** -0.110***
     0.008  0.008 0.009 
Investment opportunities         
average P/E ratio in fund’s first 3 years        0.008***  
       0.002  
average B/M ratio in fund’s first 3 years        -0.325***
        0.030 
Diagnostics         
Adjusted R2 21.7 % 20.7 % 13.6 % 13.9 % 13.9 %  14.7 % 17.1 % 
Test: all coefficients = 0 (F) 36.2*** 35.3*** 39.5*** 36.4*** 36.4***  36.1*** 41.5*** 
No. of observations 2,242 2,283 3,105 3,105 3,105  3,105 3,105 
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Table IV. The Effect of Firm Experience on Fund Performance 
The sample consists of 3,469 venture capital funds headquartered in the U.S. that were started between 1980 and 1999. The 
dependent variable is a fund’s exit rate, defined as the fraction of a fund’s portfolio companies that have been successfully 
exited via an initial public offering (IPO) or a sale to another company (M&A), as of November 2003. The first six variables 
are defined as in Table III. In addition, we include controls for the investment experience of a sample fund’s parent 
(management) firm. These are based on the parent’s investment activities measured between the parent’s creation and the 
fund’s creation. Investment activities are controlled as the parent’s age (days since its first investment), number of rounds 
participated in, aggregate dollars invested, and number of portfolio companies invested in. By definition, these four measures 
are zero for first-time funds. The experience measures are highly correlated among each other, so we include them one at a 
time. All models are estimated using ordinary least-squares. Year dummies controlling for vintage year effects are included 
but not reported. They are jointly significant but their exclusion does not affect our results. Intercepts are not shown. White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are shown in italics. (Results are robust to clustering the standard errors on firm 
id instead.) We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. 
 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Fund characteristics      
ln fund size 0.035*** 0.030***  0.030*** 0.030***
 0.011 0.011  0.011 0.011 
ln fund size squared -0.003** -0.003**  -0.003** -0.003** 
 0.002 0.002  0.002 0.002 
=1 if first fund 0.003 -0.001  0.007 -0.003 
 0.011 0.012  0.011 0.012 
=1 if seed or early-stage fund -0.025*** -0.026***  -0.024** -0.025** 
 0.010 0.010  0.010 0.010 
Competition      
ln VC inflows in fund’s vintage year -0.109*** -0.111***  -0.114*** -0.111***
 0.009 0.009  0.009 0.009 
Investment opportunities      
average B/M ratio in fund’s first 3 years -0.318*** -0.319***  -0.317*** -0.319***
 0.030 0.030  0.030 0.030 
Fund parent’s experience      
ln days since parent’s first investment 0.015***     
 0.002     
ln no. of rounds parent has participated in so far  0.017***    
  0.003    
ln aggregate $ amount parent has invested so far    0.012***  
    0.002  
ln no. of portfolio companies parent has invested in so far     0.020***
     0.004 
Diagnostics      
Adjusted R2 18.4 % 18.0 %  18.8 % 18.0 % 
Test: all coefficients = 0 (F) 44.2*** 42.7***  44.3*** 42.5*** 
No. of observations 3,105 3,105  3,105 3,105 
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Table V. The Effect of Firm Networks on Fund Performance 
The sample consists of 3,469 venture capital funds headquartered in the U.S. that were started between 1980 and 1999. The 
dependent variable is a fund’s exit rate, defined as the fraction of a fund’s portfolio companies that have been successfully 
exited via an initial public offering (IPO) or a sale to another company (M&A), as of November 2003. The first six variables 
are defined as in Table III. The experience measures considered in Table IV are highly correlated among each other. To avoid 
collinearity problems, we include only one in this table, aggregate dollars invested. This variable has the largest economic 
effect in Table III. All our results are robust to choosing any of the other experience measures instead. In addition, we control 
for the effect of the parent’s network centrality on a sample fund’s performance. The five network measures are defined in 
Table I; they are normalized by their respective theoretical maximum (e.g., the degree of a VC who has syndicated with 
every other VC in the network.). All models are estimated using ordinary least-squares. Year dummies controlling for vintage 
year effects are included but not reported. They are jointly significant but their exclusion does not affect our results. 
Intercepts are not shown. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are shown in italics. (Results are robust to 
clustering the standard errors on firm id instead, except that betweenness ceases to be significant at conventional levels.) We 
use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
Fund characteristics       
ln fund size 0.029*** 0.028** 0.027**  0.029*** 0.028** 
 0.011 0.011 0.011  0.011 0.011 
ln fund size squared -0.003** -0.003** -0.003**  -0.003** -0.003** 
 0.002 0.002 0.002  0.002 0.002 
=1 if first fund 0.008 0.011 0.010  0.007 0.011 
 0.011 0.011 0.011  0.011 0.011 
=1 if seed or early-stage fund -0.024** -0.026*** -0.024**  -0.024** -0.024** 
 0.010 0.010 0.010  0.010 0.010 
Competition       
ln VC inflows in fund’s vintage year -0.110*** -0.108*** -0.107***  -0.111*** -0.105***
 0.009 0.009 0.009  0.009 0.009 
Investment opportunities       
average B/M ratio in fund’s first 3 years -0.313*** -0.310*** -0.309***  -0.314*** -0.306***
 0.030 0.030 0.030  0.030 0.030 
Fund parent's experience       
ln aggregate $ amount parent has invested so far 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.008***  0.011*** 0.008***
 0.002 0.002 0.002  0.002 0.002 
Network measures       
outdegree  0.006***      
 0.002      
indegree  0.013***     
  0.003     
degree   0.003***    
   0.001    
betweenness      0.013**  
     0.006  
eigenvector      0.004***
      0.001 
Diagnostics       
Adjusted R2 18.9 % 19.1 % 19.1 %  18.8 % 19.1 % 
Test: all coefficients = 0 (F) 43.4*** 44.3*** 44.1***  42.8*** 44.1*** 
No. of observations 3,105 3,105 3,105  3,105 3,105 
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Table VI. Performance Persistence 
The sample consists of 1,293 second- or higher sequence number venture capital funds headquartered in the U.S. that were 
started between 1980 and 1999. The dependent variable is a fund’s exit rate, defined as the fraction of a fund’s portfolio 
companies that have been successfully exited via an initial public offering (IPO) or a sale to another company (M&A), as of 
November 2003. All variables are defined as in Table V, except lagged exit rate, which is the exit rate of the VC parent 
firm’s most recent past fund. We include lagged exit rate to control for persistence in VC performance. The five network 
measures are defined in Table I; they are normalized by their respective theoretical maximum (e.g., the degree of a VC who 
has syndicated with every other VC in the network.). All models are estimated using ordinary least-squares. Year dummies 
controlling for vintage year effects are included but not reported. They are jointly significant but their exclusion does not 
affect our results. Intercepts are not shown. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are shown in italics. (Results 
are robust to clustering the standard errors on firm id instead.) We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level (two-sided), respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
Fund characteristics       
ln fund size 0.021 0.020 0.020  0.021 0.021 
 0.018 0.018 0.018  0.018 0.018 
ln fund size squared -0.002 -0.002 -0.002  -0.002 -0.002 
 0.002 0.002 0.002  0.002 0.002 
=1 if seed or early-stage fund -0.013 -0.015 -0.013  -0.013 -0.013 
 0.013 0.013 0.013  0.013 0.013 
Competition       
ln VC inflows in fund’s vintage year -0.104*** -0.100*** -0.100***  -0.103*** -0.096***
 0.016 0.017 0.017  0.016 0.017 
Investment opportunities       
average B/M ratio in fund’s first 3 years -0.253*** -0.247*** -0.247***  -0.253*** -0.242***
 0.046 0.046 0.046  0.046 0.046 
Fund parent's experience       
ln aggregate $ amount parent has invested so far 0.008* 0.005 0.006  0.008** 0.005 
 0.004 0.004 0.004  0.004 0.004 
Fund parent's lagged performance       
lagged exit rate 0.262*** 0.256*** 0.258***  0.263*** 0.255***
 0.032 0.032 0.032  0.031 0.032 
Network measures       
outdegree  0.003      
 0.003      
indegree  0.012***     
  0.004     
degree   0.003**    
   0.001    
betweenness      0.013  
     0.009  
eigenvector      0.004** 
      0.002 
Diagnostics       
Adjusted R2 30.4 % 30.8 % 30.6 %  30.4 % 30.6 % 
Test: all coefficients = 0 (F) 30.6*** 31.1*** 30.7***  30.2*** 30.8*** 
No. of observations 1,293 1,293 1,293  1,293 1,293 
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Table VII. Panel A. Effect of Firm Networks on Portfolio Company Survival  
The sample consists of up to 13,761 portfolio companies that received their first institutional round of funding from a sample VC fund between 1980 and 1999 (and for 
which relevant cross-sectional information is available). We track each company from its first funding round across all rounds to the date of its exit or November 2003, 
whichever is sooner. The dependent variable is an indicator equaling one if the company survived from round N to round N+1 or if it exited via an IPO or M&A transaction. 
Note that survival to round N+1 is conditional on having survived to round N, so the sample size decreases from round to round. All independent variables are defined as in 
Tables III through VI. The measures of the parent’s network centrality are estimated over the five-year window ending in the year the funding round is concluded. All 
models are estimated using probit MLE. Industry effects using the Venture Economics industry groups are included but not reported. Intercepts are not shown. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are shown in italics. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively.  
 
 Survived round  Survived round  Survived round 
 1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3 
Fund characteristics           
ln fund size 0.217*** 0.159*** 0.098* 0.204*** 0.141*** 0.074 0.206*** 0.147*** 0.079  
 0.030 0.044 0.058 0.030 0.044 0.058 0.030 0.044 0.059  
ln fund size squared -0.009** -0.012** -0.007 -0.007 -0.009* -0.003 -0.007* -0.010* -0.004  
 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.007  
=1 if first fund -0.003 -0.039 -0.162*** -0.002 -0.036 -0.158*** -0.007 -0.040 -0.162***  
 0.025 0.036 0.044 0.026 0.036 0.044 0.025 0.036 0.044  
Competition           
ln VC inflows in funding year -0.125*** -0.156*** -0.080*** -0.123*** -0.160*** -0.089*** -0.121*** -0.158*** -0.075***  
 0.021 0.022 0.027 0.021 0.022 0.027 0.021 0.023 0.027  
Investment opportunities           
mean B/M ratio in funding year -0.452*** -1.058*** -1.035*** -0.440*** -1.033*** -0.929*** -0.451*** -1.085*** -1.093***  
 0.114 0.153 0.197 0.114 0.152 0.196 0.114 0.154 0.196  
Fund parent's experience           
ln aggregate $ amount invested -0.009 -0.040** -0.146*** -0.010 -0.032* -0.125*** -0.008 -0.030* -0.136***  
 0.010 0.017 0.024 0.010 0.017 0.023 0.010 0.018 0.024  
Network measures           
outdegree  0.035*** 0.044*** 0.076***        
 0.005 0.007 0.009        
indegree    0.057*** 0.064*** 0.101***     
    0.008 0.011 0.014     
degree       0.014*** 0.017*** 0.032***  
       0.002 0.003 0.004  
Diagnostics            
Pseudo R2 9.5% 4.7 % 4.0 % 9.5 % 4.7 % 3.6 % 9.4 % 4.6 % 3.7 %  
Test: all coeff. = 0 (F) 1509.9*** 386.0 *** 203.3*** 1513.7*** 380.1*** 195.3*** 1511.5*** 378.2*** 205.1***  
No. of observations 13,761 8,650 6,164 13,761 8,650 6,164 13,761 8,650 6,164  
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Table VII. Panel B. Effect of Firm Networks on Portfolio Company Survival 
 
 Survived round  Survived round 
 1 2 3  1  2 3 
Fund characteristics        
ln fund size 0.220*** 0.177*** 0.142*** 0.204***  0.134*** 0.086 
 0.031 0.044 0.056 0.030  0.044 0.059 
ln fund size squared -0.009** -0.014*** -0.013* -0.007*  -0.008 -0.005 
 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.004  0.005 0.007 
=1 if first fund -0.013 -0.051 -0.183*** -0.005  -0.034 -0.157***
 0.025 0.036 0.044 0.026  0.036 0.044 
Competition        
ln VC inflows in funding year -0.155*** -0.185*** -0.122*** -0.135***  -0.155*** -0.089***
 0.020 0.022 0.026 0.021  0.022 0.026 
Investment opportunities        
mean B/M ratio in funding year -0.453*** -0.994*** -0.782*** -0.568***  -1.105*** -0.899***
 0.115 0.153 0.198 0.115  0.153 0.198 
Fund parent's experience        
ln aggregate $ amount invested 0.015* -0.008 -0.087*** -0.026***  -0.066*** -0.158***
 0.009 0.016 0.021 0.010  0.018 0.024 
Network measures        
betweenness  0.052*** 0.093*** 0.151***     
 0.015 0.021 0.026     
eigenvector    0.027***  0.036*** 0.049***
    0.003  0.004 0.005 
Diagnostics         
Pseudo R2 9.2 % 4.5 % 3.1 % 9.7 %  5.1 % 4.0 % 
Test: all coeff. = 0 (F) 1497.9*** 371.0*** 170.9*** 1554.1***  426.8*** 236.7*** 
No. of observations 13,761 8,650 6,164 13,761  8,650 6,164 
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Table VIII. Pooled Portfolio Company Survival Models  
The sample pools 42,074 funding rounds for 13,761 portfolio companies that were concluded from 1980 onwards. We track 
each company from its first funding round across all rounds to the date of its exit or November 2003, whichever is sooner. In 
this panel structure, the dependent variable is an indicator equaling one in round N if the company survived to the next round 
N+1. Unless it subsequently exited via an IPO or M&A transaction, the dependent variable is zero in the company’s last 
recorded round. All models are estimated using panel probit estimators with random company effects. All independent 
variables are defined as in Tables III through VII. The measures of the parent’s investment experience and network centrality 
are estimated as of the year in which the funding round is concluded. Industry effects using the Venture Economics industry 
groups are included but not reported. Intercepts are not shown. Standard errors are shown in italics. We use ***, **, and * to 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
Fund characteristics       
ln fund size 0.274*** 0.250*** 0.247***  0.298*** 0.256*** 
 0.021 0.021 0.021  0.021 0.021 
ln fund size squared -0.025*** -0.021*** -0.020***  -0.028*** -0.022*** 
 0.003 0.003 0.003  0.003 0.003 
=1 if first fund -0.021 -0.021 -0.025  -0.040** -0.020 
 0.018 0.018 0.018  0.018 0.018 
Competition       
ln VC inflows in funding year -0.019* -0.019* -0.004  -0.049*** -0.023** 
 0.010 0.010 0.010  0.010 0.010 
Investment opportunities       
mean B/M ratio in funding year -0.517*** -0.482*** -0.589***  -0.404*** -0.566*** 
 0.070 0.070 0.071  0.070 0.071 
Fund parent's experience       
ln aggregate $ amount parent has invested so far -0.065*** -0.060*** -0.075***  -0.025*** -0.091*** 
 0.007 0.007 0.007  0.007 0.008 
Network measures       
outdegree  0.057***      
 0.003      
indegree  0.086***     
  0.005     
degree   0.028***    
   0.001    
betweenness      0.107***  
     0.009  
eigenvector      0.045*** 
      0.002 
Diagnostics       
Pseudo R2 5.6 % 5.6 % 5.7 %  5.1 % 5.9 % 
Test: all coeff. = 0 (χ2) 1899.1*** 1892.2*** 1918.6***  1705.2*** 1961.7*** 
No. of observations 42,074 42,074 42,074  42,074 42,074 
No. of companies 13,761 13,761 13,761  13,761 13,761 
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Table IX. Effect of Network Position on Portfolio Company Exit Duration 
The sample consists of 13,761 portfolio companies that received their first institutional round of funding (according to 
Venture Economics) from a sample VC fund between 1980 and 1999 (and for which relevant cross-sectional information is 
available). We estimate accelerated time-to-exit models (i.e., hazard models written with log time as the dependent variable) 
where log time is assumed to be normally distributed. (We obtain similar results using other distributions, such as the 
exponential, Gompertz, and Weibull. Our results are also robust to estimating semi-parametric Cox models.) Positive 
(negative) coefficients indicate that the covariate increases (decreases) the time a company takes to exit via an IPO or an 
M&A transaction. Companies that have not exited by the fund’s tenth anniversary are assumed to have been liquidated. 
Companies backed by funds that are in existence beyond November 2003 are treated as right-censored (to allow for the 
possibility that they may yet exit successfully after the end of our sample period), and the likelihood function is modified 
accordingly. The models allow for time-varying covariates. We treat market conditions as time-varying, that is, market 
conditions change every quarter between the first investment round and the final exit (or the fund’s tenth anniversary, or 
November 2003). All other independent variables are treated as time-invariant; they are defined as in Tables III through VIII. 
The measures of the parent’s investment experience and network centrality are estimated as of the year in which the portfolio 
company received its first funding round. Intercepts are not shown. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are shown 
in italics. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. 
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Table IX. Effect of Network Position on Portfolio Company Exit Duration (continued) 
 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
Fund characteristics       
ln fund size 0.029 0.033 0.033  0.024 0.042 
 0.038 0.038 0.038  0.038 0.038 
ln fund size squared 0.000 -0.001 -0.001  0.000 -0.002 
 0.005 0.005 0.005  0.005 0.005 
=1 if first fund -0.157*** -0.157*** -0.156***  -0.152*** -0.160***
 0.030 0.030 0.030  0.030 0.030 
Competition       
ln VC inflows in funding year 0.189*** 0.188*** 0.188***  0.198*** 0.184*** 
 0.026 0.026 0.026  0.025 0.025 
Investment opportunities       
mean B/M ratio in funding year 1.402*** 1.395*** 1.403***  1.408*** 1.388*** 
 0.078 0.078 0.078  0.078 0.078 
Fund parent's experience       
ln aggregate $ amount parent has invested so far -0.096*** -0.096*** -0.097***  -0.100*** -0.080***
 0.013 0.013 0.014  0.012 0.013 
Market conditions (time-varying)       
lagged NASDAQ Composite Index return  -0.719*** -0.718*** -0.718***  -0.718*** -0.718***
 0.085 0.085 0.085  0.085 0.085 
lagged ln no. of VC-backed IPOs in same VE industry -0.271*** -0.271*** -0.271***  -0.271*** -0.271***
 0.014 0.014 0.014  0.014 0.014 
lagged ln no. of VC-backed M&A deals in same VE industry 0.019 0.021 0.019  0.019 0.014 
 0.016 0.016 0.016  0.016 0.016 
Network measures       
outdegree  -0.011**      
 0.005      
indegree  -0.018**     
  0.007     
degree   -0.005**    
   0.002    
betweenness      -0.035***  
     0.013  
eigenvector      -0.014***
      0.003 
Diagnostics       
Pseudo R2 8.3 % 8.3 % 8.3 %  8.3 % 8.4 % 
Test: all coeff. = 0 (χ2) 991.0*** 999.8*** 990.1***  994.1*** 1039.5*** 
No. of observations 13,761 13,761 13,761  13,761 13,761 
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Table X. The Evolution of Network Positions 
The sample consists of a panel of first-time funds by 823 VC firms which we follow for ten years or up to November 2003, 
whichever is earlier. The average VC firm spends seven years in the sample. The total number of firm-years in the panel is 
5,800. We estimate fixed-effects panel regression models under the assumption that the disturbances are first-order 
autoregressive, to allow for persistence over time in a VC firm’s network position. We use the Baltagi and Wu (1999) 
algorithm to allow for unbalanced panels. The dependent variable is one of the five network centrality measures studied in 
the paper. We relate a firm’s network position to its experience, increases in the size of the network, and the firm’s 
performance. The latter is proxied for using the number of the firm’s portfolio companies that were sold via an IPO or M&A 
transaction in the previous year, or that received follow-on funding from an outside VC firm that was not, already, an 
investor in the company. We also attempt to control for how “eye-catching” its IPOs were by including the average degree of 
underpricing of its prior-year IPOs. Intercepts are not shown. Standard errors are shown in italics. We use ***, **, and * to 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. Note that there are at present no critical value 
tables for the two tests for zero auto-correlation reported in the table.  
 
Dependent variable: outdegree indegree degree 
between-
ness 
eigen-
vector indegree 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Firm characteristics       
lagged ln aggregate $ amt. parent has invested  0.046*** 0.044*** 0.194*** 0.008*** 0.143*** 0.023*** 
 0.009 0.005 0.021 0.003 0.017 0.005 
Network growth       
ln no. of new funds raised -0.010 -0.006 -0.029 0.003 0.099*** -0.004 
 0.012 0.007 0.029 0.003 0.023 0.007 
Firm performance       
lagged ln no. of IPOs 0.033* 0.000 0.024 -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 
 0.020 0.012 0.048 0.006 0.038 0.011 
lagged ln no. of M&A deals 0.067*** -0.002 -0.011 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 0.025 0.014 0.059 0.007 0.047 0.014 
lagged ln no. of outside-led follow-on rounds 0.046*** 0.041*** 0.184*** 0.009*** 0.044** 0.033*** 
 0.011 0.006 0.027 0.003 0.021 0.006 
lagged ln average IPO underpricing 0.061* 0.041** 0.200*** 0.000 0.136** 0.037** 
 0.031 0.018 0.075 0.009 0.059 0.018 
Past investment in reciprocity       
lagged outdegree      0.226*** 
      0.005 
       
Diagnostics       
R2 27.4 % 28.7 % 26.7 % 17.6 % 23.5 % 65.5 % 
F-test: all coeff. = 0 10.7*** 22.0*** 25.0*** 3.5*** 20.9*** 87.3*** 
Auto-correlation (ρ) 0.827 0.863 0.844 0.794 0.832 0.813 
Tests for zero auto-correlation:       
   Modified Bhargava et al. Durbin-Watson  0.462 0.513 0.535 0.478 0.472 0.560 
   Baltagi-Wu LBI statistic 0.775 0.825 0.845 0.817 0.827 0.830 
Correlation (fixed effects, X variables) 0.422 0.407 0.397 0.346 0.373 0.641 
F-test: all fixed effects = 0 4.7*** 5.4*** 5.5*** 3.8*** 5.1*** 4.4*** 
              
 
